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ABSTRACT 
 
Chef Executive Officer (CEO) compensation has become a very interesting topic of debate in 
the finance literature. This work addresses several research topics, some of which are still 
unexplored, regarding the compensation related to performance and innovation, performance in 
high-tech firms, corporate innovation and risk taking in high-tech firms. In order to reduce this 
gap, this investigation analyzes different components of CEO compensation in high-technology 
firms, performance, innovation and risk taking, and different econometrics models are tested. 
Firstly, executive compensation in high-technology firms in the US is studied and the S&P 
index is chosen in the period between 2000 and 2010. A panel data methodology is used to 
analyze the relationship between corporate performance and CEO compensation in high-
technology firms. Total CEO compensation and short- and long-term compensations are tested 
according to corporate performance models. Total short- and long-term CEO compensation in 
high-technology firms is compared to other industrial sectors from standard classification codes 
and analyzed for each year. 
Then, the analysis focuses on the effects of introducing the Standard Financial Accounting, 
statement 123 (R), on corporate performance, and all its accounting rules and underlying 
obligations. The effects of the statement 123 (R) are tested for the periods before and after 
implementation, and the importance of stock options accounting in high-technology firms is 
assessed. This study leads to a better understanding of the relationship between CEO 
compensation through its components and performance in high-technology firms. 
Finally, this study analyzes the relationship between corporate performance and innovation in 
CEO compensation in high-technology firms in the same firm sample. Finance variables are used 
as return on assets to measure performance and R&D expenses, and the number of patents and 
brands is used to measure innovation in a system equation and test the econometric model.  
The overall results confirm the importance of executive compensation in firm performance 
and the influence that executive compensation has on innovation. Moreover, the results show that 
innovation is selected as opposed to performance by the CEOs when they are responsible for 
promoting the firms’ goals.  
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RESUMO 
 
A compensação dos executivos tornou-se uma questão muito interessante em debate na 
literatura financeira. Este trabalho analisa vários tópicos de investigação, alguns dos quais ainda 
pouco explorados, como a relação da performance e inovação da empresa com a compensação 
dos executivos, a performance nas empresas de alta tecnologia, a inovação empresarial e a 
tomada do risco nessas empresas. Ao longo desta investigação, são usadas as empresas do índice 
S&P nos Estados Unidos, são analisadas diferentes componentes da remuneração do executivo, a 
performance da empresa é avaliado através de várias variáveis financeiras, a inovação é medida 
pela investigação e desenvolvimento (I&D), número de patentes e marcas, e são testados por 
diferentes modelos econométricos. 
Em primeiro lugar, é estudada a compensação dos executivos em empresas de alta tecnologia 
nos Estados Unidos e escolhido o índice S&P no período entre 2000 e 2010, utilizando uma 
metodologia de dados em painel para analisar a relação entre a performance das empresas e a 
compensação do CEO em empresas de alta tecnologia. É testada a compensação total do 
executivo no curto e no longo prazo em relação à performance da empresa. A compensação total 
do executivo no curto e longo prazo nas empresas de alta tecnologia é comparada com outros 
setores industriais com o mesmo código de classificação e analisados para cada ano. 
Em seguida, a análise centra-se nos efeitos da introdução da norma contabilística 123 (R) na 
performance das empresas, assim como na regra de contabilização e obrigações subjacentes. São 
testados os efeitos da norma contabilística 123 (R) antes e após a implementação, e a importância 
da contabilização das opções de ações em empresas de alta tecnologia. Deste estudo resulta uma 
melhor compreensão da relação entre a remuneração do CEO e as suas componentes e a 
performance das empresas de alta tecnologia. 
Finalmente, é analisada a relação entre a performance das empresas e inovação na 
compensação do CEO em empresas de alta tecnologia para a mesma amostra. São usadas 
variáveis financeiras como a rentabilidade dos ativos para medir a performance e despesas de 
I&D, número de patentes e marcas para medir a inovação num sistema de equações para testar o 
modelo econométrico 
Em suma, os resultados evidenciam a importância da compensação dos executivos na 
performance das empresas, a influência da compensação dos executivos na inovação, e ainda a 
preferência da inovação à performance quando o CEO tem responsabilidade na prossecução dos 
objetivos da empresa. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“That which is dreamed can never be lost, can never be undreamed.”  
Neil Gaiman, The Sandman, Vol. 10: The Wake 
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1. General introduction 
 
1.1 Motivation and purpose of this research 
 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation has been strongly discussed in the literature 
since late 1970s and early 1980s up to the present days and there is no consensus. Following the 
world financial crisis, numerous stories have appeared recently in the financial press 
demonstrating how many executives define our contract remuneration. These news and striking 
reports have raised concerns on compensation. In most corporate scandals in history, such as 
Enron’s, there has always been some underlying accusation of top executives and their 
management of the firm.  Some critics argue that high levels of compensation and reciprocal 
relationships with the CEO might have compromised the directors’ ability to monitor managers in 
the interest of shareholders. Nevertheless, no consensus view has emerged, and there is still much 
to learn about how CEO compensation is determined in firms, and particularly in high-technology 
firms.  
Noting the hegemony of high-technologies firms in the last decades in terms of performance 
and innovation, the growing interest in issues about contractual conditions to compensate the 
executive and on the other hand the frequently shocking news that firms with poor performance 
have pay high compensations levels to their executives, these apparent paradoxical reasons are 
motivated  this study. Understand the relation between performance and innovation in high-tech 
firms and the contractual conditions to compensate the executives when they are responsible for 
this fact. 
The main goal of this study is to understand if high-tech CEOs are paid better when the 
firm´s value is increased through performance or by improving innovation, knowing that it may 
be difficult to achieve that for a particular period of a time. Improving innovation through 
research and development, patents and brands requires continuous investments that are not always 
compatible with the better profitability necessary for a good finance performance. To achieve this 
goal, this thesis addresses the problem in three phases: firstly, it studies the relation between 
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executive compensation and performance in high-tech firms. Then it tries to understand the 
components of compensation and their accounting, particularly stock options; finally, innovation 
accruals are included in order to analyze how total compensation is determined.   
According to the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 2 (SFAS 2), Accounting for 
Research and Development Costs (Financial Accounting Standards Board, 1974), research 
activity refers to the initial work done on a systematic basis in order to create new knowledge to 
develop a new product, service or process, or at least improve the existing product, service or 
process significantly. Development activity refers to the application of the knowledge resulting 
from the research activity in the actual design and construction of the product, service or process 
with the aim of selling or using it. Thus, research and development (R&D) activity deals with the 
creation and utilization of knowledge with the intention of improving the financial and economic 
outcomes of a firm. High-level R&D will encourage the adoption of new processes, systems and 
technology in firms in relation to their ability to innovate and perform. Even though various 
papers examine the determinants of innovation, how innovation affects corporate financial 
policies remains a promising understudied research area. 
Because of these issues, this study first attempts to examine the relationship between executive 
pay, firm performance and innovation for a sample of US high-tech companies over a period of 
eleven years. At the same time, this dissertation examines the effects of introducing the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) statement 123 (R) in corporate performance during the 
same period. Building on the agency view of corporate governance, this work proposes that 
technology-intensive firms use both outcome and behavior-based performance criteria for 
rewarding CEOs. Thirdly, in particular, it examines the dynamics between performance and 
innovation managed by the CEOs and their rewards when they legitimately pursue the ideals of 
the shareholders. These three issues were addressed in each essay included in the dissertation. 
The purpose of this study is to examine the effects that CEO pay has on performance and 
innovation in high-technology firms when driving management goals. This research adds to a 
handful of similar studies published on corporate governance in the high-technology sector, and 
makes it possible to test whether the existing evidence holds for a market, such as the US, with 
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historically different managerial pay structures and heterogeneous corporate governance systems 
between different sectors. Specifically, this study contributes to building a better understanding 
of executive compensation, performance, innovation and corporate governance issues in the US 
high-tech industry in several ways. This dissertation fills this gap using data collected on 
executive compensation, performance and innovation in US high-tech firms over the period 
2000-2010 using performance and innovation measurements collected in financial databases.   
 
 
1.2 The role of CEO compensation in high-technology firms 
 
Despite its long history and widespread application, the agency theory continues to foster a 
debate on the controversy of executive compensation. While some authors argue that the 
principal can design a contract based on the outcomes of the agent behavior, which aligns the 
preferences of the agent and the principal, others focus on the negative consequences of 
compensation, suggesting that greater agent risk causes executives to make decisions designed to 
reduce personal risk and not maximizing performance. The agency theory assumes that agents are 
self-serving individuals who are effort- and risk-averse (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
The agency theory presents some problems. The directors are responsible for monitoring 
management in order to reduce the conflict between shareholders and executives. However, the 
mutual favor and interconnection between shareholders and executives cause the disciplining role 
to be more fragile (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). Hunton and Rose (2008) also indicate that the 
CEO might pursue self-interests when making accounting choices. Moreover, shareholders might 
even ingratiate themselves with executives to have risk bearing incentives. Bebchuk and Fried 
(2003) suggest that CEO behavior is subject to an agency problem that in turn addresses agency 
problems in their compensation. Therefore, the compensation contracts for CEOs designed to 
resolve agency problems could contribute to agency conflict. (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). 
As Aboody and Lev (2000) and M. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest, CEOs should 
possess the highest knowledge of the firm, which implies that CEOs should have a better 
understanding than owners about the optimal level of R&D spending, thus allowing for more 
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informed, timely actions by the CEO. This asymmetry in information allows CEOs to make 
adequate reductions in R&D spending, which Joseph P. O'Connor, Jr., Joseph E. Coombs, and 
Gilley (2006) believe is problematic because decisions that benefit short-term performance often 
do not lead to long-term benefits for shareholders. These consequences make reductions in R&D 
spending relevant because shareholders generally find R&D spending desirable due to their 
interests in greater risk-taking, as opposed to CEOs and their interests in long-term firm 
performance. 
As Makri et al. (2006) report, CEO total pay was associated with innovation behavior in high-
technology firms, while Balkin et al. (2000) suggest that compensation is more likely to align 
CEO pay with behaviors towards R&D in high rather than low R&D intensive firms. Therefore, 
reductions in R&D spending in high R&D intensive firms may not lead to short-term pay 
increases for underpaid CEOs. Managers in high-tech firms are faced with different sets of 
performance expectations such as innovation, new product development, integration of 
technology and research and development management (Shim et al., 2009). 
High-technology firms have their own special features which separate them from other firms. 
That poses unique corporate governance problems not only for managers, but also for claimants 
on R&D activity to create and use knowledge with the intention of improving a firm’s financial 
position (Belloc, F. 2013) 
In high-technology firms it is possible to find innovation, R&D investments and some assets 
with essential competitive advantage and there are, at the same time, some risks. Different R&D 
spending in firms is indication of a large variance in firm performance. The returns on high-tech 
investment are skewed and highly uncertain, in part because R&D projects have a low probability 
of succeeding financially and because there is asymmetric information shared between firms and 
potential investors (Percival, J., & Mcgrath, C., 2013). This happens because it is difficult to 
increase high-tech investments and often insiders will have much better information than 
outsiders about the prospects of the firm's investments. High-tech investments often have limited 
value R&D investment, which is predominantly salary payments (Carpenter & Petersen, 2002). 
For these reasons, it is pertinent and interesting to examine the role of the CEOs and their 
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compensation for managing high-tech firms, thus contributing to improving research in this area, 
as well as the understanding of CEO compensation. 
 
1.3 The methodology 
 
This study uses a sample of US firms listed on the stock exchange, the S&P index. The 
classification for high-technology firms is the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC). The 
industry groups such as computer & office equipment, computer storage devices, terminals, 
services-computer programming services, services-prepackaged software and services-computer 
integrated systems design.  
The period under analysis is the period between 2000 and 2010. The data were collected 
from the same firm every year and the sample was organized as panel data. With panel data it is 
possible to combine time and cross-sectional data and make more credible statistical inferences. 
One of the advantages of panel data estimation is the fact that it point out individual 
heterogeneity. Thus, panel data suggest the existence of differentiating characteristics in the 
individuals studied and these features may or may not be constant over time. The second 
advantage of panel data is that it provides a larger amount of information, the data are more 
variable, the variables are not as collinear, the degrees of freedom are higher and the estimation is 
more efficient. Furthermore, it not only makes it possible to identify and measure effects that 
cannot be detected in pure cross-sectional or time studies, but also to build and test complex 
behavioral patterns, particularly using models with distributed lags with few restrictions.  
Different econometric estimation methods are used according to the sample and according to 
the specification of the performance, innovation and executive compensation equation that best 
explains the research question presented in each essay.  
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1.4 Plan of presentation  
 
This dissertation is the result of three essays developed over the last four years, and it is 
divided into five chapters. After a brief introduction addressing the main purposes of this work 
(provided in Chapter 1), Chapter 2 presents the first essay on CEO compensation and its relation 
to performance. The second essay is an extension of the first as it addresses the total 
compensation model for the short- and long-term. Panel data generalized least squares (GLS) and 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) methods were estimated to create two other models, one 
for total compensation, and another for both total and cash compensation in the period between 
2000 and 2010.  
Chapter 3 examines the effects of introducing the financial accounts standard, the statement 
123 (R), and exploits the change in the accounting treatment of stock-option compensation, as 
well as the fair-value report which entered into force in December 2005, in the period of analysis. 
A Panel data SUR model is used to estimate total compensation and cash compensation as a 
proportion of total pay for the period between 2000 and 2010. It was found that there is an 
increase in CEO compensation after introducing the SFAS 123 (R). Although the change in the 
plan design was not analyzed, a new accommodation of CEO compensation was found as a result 
of the new rules of the SFAS 123 (R). 
To complete the main purpose of this dissertation, Chapter 4 investigates the relation between 
CEO compensation in high-tech firms and their choice between performance and innovation 
when managing high-tech firms. The literature on high-technology firms is examined, and the 
relationship between the CEO behaviors on corporate governance is discussed, along with the 
aggregate innovation activity of corporations. Innovation is measured as R&D expenses, number 
of patents and brands. After a brief review of the inter-relationship between CEO compensation, 
performance and innovation suggested that, from an econometric point of view, a system of three 
simultaneous equations should be formulated that specify the relationship between the 
abovementioned variables. Panel data Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) and General 
Method of Moments (GMM) methods were used to estimate total compensation as function of 
performance and innovation. 
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Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes the results of the four essays, pointing out their limitations and 
presenting some topics for future research. 
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CHAPTER 21 
Executive Compensation for the long- and short-term in High-Technology 
Firms 
 
  
                                                          
1 Part of this chapter is published in China-USA Business Review, Volume 12, Number 11, 2013 (125). 
We are grateful to Professor Jerry Haar at Florida International University for discussing this paper at the 
International Academy of Management and Business, 15th Conference in Lisbon, in April 2013 and Contemporary 
Issues in Business, Management and Education ‘2013, in November. We are also grateful to anonymous attendees 
and professors present at this conference for their helpful comments. 
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1. Introduction 
 
While most management scholars would agree that technological innovation is a key source 
for competitive advantage in high-technology firms and that top executives in those firms should 
be rewarded accordingly, little is known about which executive pay policies are more appropriate 
for those organizations to promote such goals. The high-technology sector plays a pivotal role in 
the new economy and has become the major source of employment and productivity growth over 
the last years. Innovativeness is also one of the fundamental instruments for growth strategies to 
enter new markets and to provide the company with a competitive edge.  
The purpose of this study is to investigate the relation between the Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) pay and the value, performance, and behavior of the firms in terms of innovation in high-
technologies. This work will contribute to this subject as it introduces a new measurement 
pertaining to the relationship between the CEO and the other members of the top executive team. 
Furthermore, this paper studies the relation between this measurement and the performance and 
behavior of firms in terms of innovation. For that, this paper will use a new data sample of high-
tech companies in the S&P for the period between 2000 and 2010. 
In their paper, entitled “The CEO pay slice”, Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2011) studied 
the relation between the CEO pay slice and the value, performance, and behavior of public firms, 
demonstrating a rich set of relations between these aspects. Furthermore, Makri, Lane, and 
Gomez-Mejia (2006) reported empirical evidence that high-technology firms that use outcome-
based and behavior-based performance criteria to reward executives exhibit better market 
performance than those that do not. Their research on innovation CEO pay linkages in high-
technology firms has focused on aligning pay with the quantity of innovation inputs (R&D 
spending) and outputs (number of patents). In fact, authors show the importance of the quality of 
innovation outputs. They argue that for CEO pay-performance relations in high-technology firms 
these views are not incompatible, but represent two sides of the same coin (Makri, Lane, & 
Gomez-Mejia, 2006). Moreover, as pointed out by Makri, Lane and Gomez-Mejia to engage in 
innovative projects leading to innovations, the incentive schemes play a pivotal role in inducing 
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senior organizational managers. Furthermore, to secure the stream of innovations a firm needs to 
enhance its economic performance with a proper pay scheme to encourage executives (Makri et 
al., 2006). Appropriate incentives can be the tools in many cases, however, by basing 
compensation on changes in shareholder wealth. According to Graham (2012), managers often 
have better information than shareholders and boards in terms of identifying investment 
opportunities and assessing the profitability of potential projects. Furthermore, the fact that 
managers are expected to make higher investment decisions explains why shareholders relinquish 
decision rights over their assets by purchasing common stock (Graham et al., 2012). 
The theory summarizes that executive pay should be designed by the board to maximize 
shareholder value. The level and structure of executive pay have already been discussed in the 
literature, resulting in three dominant views. One strand of literature studies the pay-to-
performance sensitivity. Jensen and Murphy (1990a) showed that CEO wealth is only weakly 
related to firm performance. Subsequently, another view provides abundant evidence of a 
significant increase in CEO pay in both absolute and relative terms since 1990, which is 
consistent with a better alignment of interests between managers and shareholders (Murphy, 
1999; Bebchuk & Fried, 2004; Frydman, 2009). Another important strand of literature explains 
the level and the functional form of pay as skimming issues rather than optimal contracting 
outcomes. 
The inner workings of a top executive team and their importance for firm performance and 
innovation are hard to observe or quantify. As previously described, in order to promote firm 
growth, sustainable advantage, innovation and performance behavior, the role of the CEO is 
fundamental. Furthermore, over the last years, due to the effects of the global financial crisis, the 
role of the CEO has been called into question, as well as their behavior and their pay-
compensation as a result of their performance and objectives. Moreover, it is essential to maintain 
confidence in the executive for there to be a balance between the institutions that foster the best 
conditions for their employees and maximize the profits of their shareholders. For these reasons, 
and because this subject is pertinent, it is interesting to examine these issues and contribute to the 
enrichment of research in this area. 
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This study explores the performance determinants of the high-tech and all other CEO pays 
for long-term and short-term periods. This work also attempts to examine the systematic 
difference in CEO pays and the performance expectations of high-tech firms and other firms. 
Furthermore, this paper attempts to examine how in high-tech and others sectors, CEO pays are 
related to various performance measurements, such as assets and employment in their specificity 
in high-tech firms, sales growth, operating income before depreciation, net income before 
extraordinary items and discontinued operations, and earnings per share (Epstein & Roy, 2005).. 
This work is organized as follows: Section two contains a revision of the main theories in 
the literature, as well as an analysis of executive compensation in order to address agency 
problems. Furthermore, this section provides an analysis in order to examine CEO pays for 
performance and the appropriate measurements of corporate financial performance in high-
technology firms. Section three explains the research hypotheses and section four presents the 
methodology, sample, and data collection for the regression estimation, as well as the results of 
the econometric model in order to assess the influence that firm performance has on executive 
compensation. Lastly, the main conclusions are discussed, as well as some limitations and new 
perspectives for future research. 
 
2. Corporate Performance and CEO Compensation 
 
In the period between 1970 and 2005, it was observed that executive compensations 
increased tremendously. The underlying reasons for these executive compensations need to be 
discussed and analyzed so as to provide a better understanding on this matter as we move into the 
future. Much literature on executive compensation has emerged since Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) published their work. According to Jensen and Murphy (1990b): 
There are serious problems with CEO compensation, but “excessive” pay is not the biggest 
issue. The relentless focus on how much CEOs are paid diverts public attention from the real 
problem—how CEOs are paid. In most publicly held companies, the compensation of top 
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executives is virtually independent of performance (pp 138). 
 
2.1 Executive Compensations to Address Agency Problems 
The emergence and general acceptance of the agency theory and the parallel research on 
executive compensation began in the early 1980s. It was the evolution of the modern corporation 
with ownership separation and control that undermined the agency theory. Early studies in this 
area focused on documenting the relation between CEO pay and company performance. 
The problem of managerial power is analyzed in modern finance as an agency problem. The 
discussion of executive compensation must proceed with the fundamental agency problem 
afflicting management decision-making as background. According to Jensen and Murphy 
(1990a), there are two approaches to agency problems. The authors state that there is an optimal 
contracting approach, which is when boards use design compensation schemes to maximize 
shareholder value with efficient incentives. To connect the agency problem and the executive 
compensation, the authors use the managerial power approach, when this connection is seen as an 
integral part of the agency problems. It is important to remember that the principal-agent 
problems treat the difficulties that arise under conditions where information is incomplete and 
asymmetric whenever a principal hires an agent (Jensen & Murphy, 1990a). The agency theory is 
directed as an agency relationship between principal and agent in which one part—the 
principal—delegates work to another—the agent—, who performs that work. It is created at any 
company that is not owned by its manager. This theory may be summarized as having two 
problems: firstly, the agency problems arise when the desires or goals of the principal and agent 
are conflicting and when it is difficult or expensive for the principle to verify what the agent is 
doing; the second is the problem of risk sharing that arises when the principal and agent have 
different attitudes towards risk. Maybe the agent and the principal prefer different actions and 
different risk choices. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggested that the agents of a company have 
the tendency to expropriate from the company because the benefits are higher than the cost as 
such costs are shared or undertaken by various shareholders. Therefore, there should be a 
balance, and both parties’ participation constraints should be satisfied. According to them, the 
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agency problem existed in all organizations and cooperatives, including universities (Jensen & 
Meckling 1976). The agency problem is a classic problem in corporate governance as a result to 
motivate executives to do what is best for their company when they themselves do not own the 
company. It is necessary to anticipate the agency problem as because of it company investors 
may try to specify how the manager should act. Furthermore, it is necessary to analyze this 
problem because the owner may not be able to predict the business and may not know the best 
action for their manager (Shleifer & Vishny, 1996). The contracts signed between shareholders 
and managers are usually general, specifying broad goals and the division of profits. These 
contracts do not specify how managers should behave in specific business situations. 
Some authors see the weakness of shareholder rights more generally and warn shareholders 
and their advisers to focus on the corporate governance provisions that really matter for the 
firm’s value (Bebchuk, Cohen, & Ferrell, 2009; Cremers & Nair, 2005). To help solve the 
apparent theoretical paradox in agency predictions on the normative consequences of 
performance-based pay, it is possible to create a common fate for the principal and the agent, or 
to make the agent overly conservative. The agency theory has been the foundation for both 
positive and negative answers to the key question: Does incentive compensation help high-
technology firms attain higher subsequent performance levels (Makri, Lane, & Gomez-Mejia, 
2006)? 
Some authors assume CEOs to be more powerful when they serve as chair of the board, 
when they are the only member of the board, and when they have the status of a founder (Adams, 
Almeida, & Ferreira, 2005).  
 
2.2 Examining CEO Pay-for-Performance  
For Murphy (1999), the components of CEO pay are substantially heterogeneous in pay 
practices across firms and industries. Most executive pay packages contain four basic 
components: a base salary, an annual bonus linked to accounting performance, stock options, and 
long-term incentive plans. Moreover, executives participate in employee benefit plans and also 
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receive special benefits, such as life insurance and supplemental executive retirement plans. 
Today the packages of most CEO compensations have many components, which include payouts 
for long-run incentive plans, restrict option grants and restrict stock grants, pension plans, various 
perquisites and, in some cases, severance payments. Perquisites, pensions, and severance pay are 
important, and yet less understood components (Frydman & Jenter, 2010; Jensen & Murphy, 
1990a). It is difficult to obtain information on these components because of insufficient 
disclosure. Some authors suggest that the perks may be a signal of weak corporate governance, 
particularly when firms find ways to conceal the re-porting of perks (Grinstein, Weinbaum, & 
Yehuda, 2011). For pensions, the evidence is similar to that of the perquisites (Sundaram & 
Yermack, 2007). Executive pay substantial attention to the salary-determination process because 
salaries comprise a declining percentage of total compensation. Base salaries are key components 
of executive employment contracts and represent the fixed component in executive contracts. 
Executives will naturally prefer a dollar increase in base salary to a dollar increase in target bonus 
or variable compensation, and so the target bonuses, for example, are typically expressed as a 
percentage of base salary. Each dollar increase in the base salary has positive implications on 
many other compensation components. Most compensation components are measured relatively 
to base salary levels, for example, the option grants are expressed as a multiple of base salary. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, there was a steady increase in stock option grants within executive 
compensation, which on a Black-Scholes basis now constitutes the single largest component of 
CEO pay. Stock options are contracts which give the recipient the right to buy a share of stock at 
a pre-specified exercise price for a pre-specified term. In other words, the recipient has the option 
to buy a certain number of company shares for a specified price. Therefore, there is a direct link 
between managerial rewards and share-price appreciation. The incentives from stock options do 
not, however, mimic the incentives from stock ownership because only stock-price appreciation 
is rewarded, as opposed to total shareholder returns. Therefore, the value of options increases 
with stock-price volatility. Other reason for this is that the options lose incentive value once the 
stock price falls sufficiently below the exercise price. 
The literature focuses on equity-based compensation paid in the form of restricted stocks, 
stock options, and other instruments whose value is tied to future equity returns. Equity-based 
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compensation is widely documented in the research examining pay versus performance (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976). Murphy (2003) and Jensen (2004) stated that the increase in stock options 
pay is the result of the boards’ inability to evaluate the true cost of this form of compensation. 
The controversy over CEO compensation reflects a perception that CEOs effectively set their 
own pay levels. In most companies, the last decisions over executive pay are made by members 
outside the board of directors who are keenly aware of the conflicts of interest between managers 
and shareholders over the level of pay. However, the CEOs and other top managers exert at least 
some influence on the level and on the structure of their pay (Jensen & Murphy, 1990a; Murphy, 
1999). 
In the substantial heterogeneity across companies and industries, executive bonus plans can 
be categorized in terms of three basic components: performance measurements, performance 
standards, and the structure of the pay-performance relation. Hall and Liebman (1998) showed 
that CEOs are, in fact, not paid like bureaucrats, but that there is a strong relationship between 
firm performance and CEO compensation. The annual bonus contracts are characterized by 
discretion. In some firms, boards can use discretion while allocating a fixed bonus, but discretion 
in this case only affects individual allocations and not the overall amount of the executive 
payouts. A percentage of their bonus depends on individual performance. Nevertheless, this is a 
subjective issue because individual performance sometimes includes performance pertaining to 
some pre-determined objectives or strategic mile-stones. Often the non-financial performance 
measurement used in annual incentive plans is individual performance with performance 
measured relatively to pre-established objectives, as well as subjective assessments of individual 
performance. Other non-financial measurements include customer satisfaction, operational and 
strategic objectives. 
Some research highlights the importance of debt-based compensation as an element of top 
management contracts, and also the underlying incentive and governance implications of these 
schemes. Debt-base compensation provides managers with research that includes interesting 
incentives to reduce the agency cost or debt. Inside debt in the form of pensions also exerts strong 
influence on the patterns of CEO turnover and other types of compensation (Sundaram & 
Yermack, 2007). All this research is based on the assumption that managerial compensations 
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consist of only two components, cash and equity-linked instruments. These authors argue that top 
managers receive significant compensations from “inside debt” that are pensions and deferred 
compensations.  
In recent years, the use of restricted stock has been increasing due to a combination of 
reasons. Firstly, a compelling advantage held by stock options was eliminated as companies were 
required to recognize a charge to earnings on fixed option grants at fair market value. Secondly, 
publicly traded companies became concerned about the excessive dilution that resulted when the 
majority of long-term incentives were granted in options. Restricted stock plans offer companies 
much more design flexibility. Restricted stocks can be criticized mainly because of the dividend 
equivalents which have to be paid on these stocks prior to the vesting of the stocks. Some authors 
draw attention to the complete elimination of dividend equivalents, while others insist on its 
continued use as a way to align the interests of management and shareholders in order to solve 
agency problems. 
Earnings Per Share (EPS) are a popular performance metric used in executive compensation 
contracts (Murphy, 1999; Conyon et al., 2000). As it is commonly known, this ratio is influenced 
and directly punished by the increase in restricted stocks and dividend equivalents. Compensation 
contracts that tie managerial rewards to EPS create explicit incentives for executives to manage 
the EPS denominator using stock repurchases (over and above any implicit market-based 
incentives associated with increasing stock-based wealth and improving job security). However, 
these direct incentives are still absent in compensation contracts that employ non-per-share-based 
earning metrics, such as return on assets, and non-accounting measurements, such as stock price 
or qualitative targets linked to personal objectives. Accordingly, the stock repurchases activity 
will be positively associated with the incidence of EPS-based performance conditions in 
executive compensation contracts (Core, Guay, & Verrecchia, 2003; Young & Jing, 2011). The 
author argues that the level of dividend payments and the choice between dividends and stock are 
sensitive to the executives’ compensation arrangements. Furthermore, a statistically and 
economically strong link between stock repurchase activity and the presence of EPS performance 
conditions in executive compensation contracts is documented. Additionally, if stock options are 
a sub-optimal incentive contract, Sesil et al. (2006) expect that, in terms of  firm performance, 
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there will be a decrease in earnings or an increase in earnings with a reduction in the rate of 
return on assets (Sesil et al., 2006). 
For Murphy (1999), the levels of pay are higher and pay-performance sensitivities are lower 
in larger firms. However, the levels of pay and pay-performance sensitivities are lower in 
regulated utilities than in industrial firms. With that analysis, it was also possible to understand 
that pay-performance sensitivities are driven primarily by stock options and stock ownership, and 
not by other forms of compensation. 
Bebchuk and Fried (2004) advocated that managerial power has played a key role in shaping 
managers’ pay arrangements. The pervasive role of managerial power can largely explain the 
contemporary landscape of executive compensation. The managers’ influence over their own pay 
has been the focal point of the criticism on executive compensation in the media and by some 
shareholders. They argue, with supporting evidence, that when executives have more power, their 
pay is higher and less sensitive to performance. In their opinion, executive pay is much less 
sensitive to performance than has been commonly acknowledged (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004). 
Other authors study the opportunistic timing of option grants and their relation to firm 
governance and structure (Berger, Ofek, & Yermack, 1997; Bebchuk, Cremers, & Peyer, 2011; 
Bebchuk, Grinstein, & Peyer, 2010). Malmendier and Tate (2009), Bertrand and Schoar (2003) 
study how the type and style of a CEO affect the firm’s outcomes. For that, the authors analyzed 
the CEOs’ roles in achieving superstar status to the performance of their firms, and whether and 
how individual managers are affected by corporate behavior and by performance (Malmendier & 
Tate, 2009; Bertrand & Schoar, 2003). When other sectors were compared, it was possible to 
confirm that the success of high-tech firms depends more on managing intangible assets. Some of 
these assets were technology innovation, continuous improvement, software development, and 
knowledge-based management. High-tech firms must continuously innovate to survive and to 
sustain their firms’ growth (Shim, Lee, & Joo, 2009). 
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2.3 Appropriate measurements of corporate financial performance in high-technology firms 
This chapter provides an analysis on the different forms of measuring the firm’s performance 
and how these engage to the level of CEO pay. The behavior of high-tech firms and its 
contribution to CEO compensation for the short- and long-term are also analyzed. Shim (2009) 
argues that it is possible to confirm that the success of high-tech firms depends more on 
managing intangible assets. Some of these assets are technology innovation, continuous 
improvement, software development and knowledge-based management. High-tech firms must 
continuously innovate to survive and to sustain their growth (Shim et al., 2009).  
Equity-based compensation is widely documented in the research examining pay versus 
performance (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Murphy (2003) and Jensen (2004) state that the 
increase in stock options pay is the result of the boards’ inability to evaluate the true cost of this 
form of compensation. The use of equity-based compensation is encouraged by all stakeholders, 
such as investors, regulators and academics. The controversy over CEO compensation reflects a 
perception that CEOs effectively set their own pay levels. In most companies, the last decisions 
over executive pay are made by members outside the board of directors who are keenly aware of 
the conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders over the level of pay. However, the 
CEOs and other top managers exert at least some influence on the level and on the structure of 
their pay (K. J. Murphy, 1999). 
In recent years, the use of restricted stocks in compensation executives has increased and has 
been widely criticized when these executives received dividend equivalents on restricted stocks 
before the vesting period. Agency cost benefits of dividend equivalent rights argue that this 
practice helps executives focus on the business, and rewards them for managing the business to 
produce cash. Therefore, this is encouraged because it is a way of distributing dividends by 
shareholders (Akpotaire, 2011).  
Restricted stock awards are profitable for executives because the income tax consequences 
can be more favorable to employees than stock options. The special case of the USA and the 
consequences of a restricted stock mean that in some cases the award can be structured to allow 
for the deferral of all tax until the time of the stock sale, and for all appreciation to be taxed at 
capital gain rates, even if the stock is appreciated prior to vesting. In contrast, stock options can 
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result in ordinary income to the recipient the stock has appreciated prior to vesting, with only the 
post-exercise appreciation deferred to the time of sale at capital gains rates. Furthermore, the 
preferred stock usually carries no voting rights but may carry a dividend and may have priority 
over common stock in the payment of dividends and upon liquidation. The preferred share 
investor is entitled to a preset rate of dividend that must be paid out of earnings before any 
dividends are distributed to common shareholders. These dividends receive favorable tax 
treatment relatively to other forms of income. 
The use of options at the executive level associated with an increase in performance is not 
clear in the literature. Some argue that it is associated with a higher profit and output (Core et al., 
2003a), while others state the opposite (Hall & Murphy, 2003). The use of stock options reduces 
the agency cost and incentive to maximize value creation for shareholders, and encourages risk 
taking, then accounting is shown by measuring corporate finance (Sesil et al., 2006). They argue 
that adopting stock options has an impact on firm financial performance to increase operating 
income (OI) and investments in assets. However, there will be a significant decrease in return on 
assets (ROA). Others who have done previous research on stock options have focused on pay-
for-performance elasticity (Hall & Murphy, 2003), while others have focused more on the 
determinants of share-based adoption (Core et al., 2003a). The adoption of stock options is 
associated to higher growth in income, but to significantly lower return on assets (ROA), which 
is evidence that options promote sub-optimal over investment. 
The company’s measurements are consistent with vision, mission and strategies for long-
term performance and the financial criteria to monitor CEO compensation (Epstein & Roy, 
2005). Usually in the USA, the compensation programs combine incentives for short- and long-
term periods with a set of performance measurements.  
In summary, it was found that firms are subjected to the agency problem in which the CEO 
may not work in favor of the shareholders to maximize their wealth by improving firm 
performance. Furthermore, the decisions related to CEO compensation are based on the firms’ 
accounting and finance performance. Therefore, it is theorized that CEO compensation according 
to firm performance using variables such as assets,, return on assets, sales growth, operating 
income before depression, employees, changes in sales operating income before depreciation net 
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income before extraordinary items and discontinued operation and earning per share suited the 
high-technology firms, as presented above. 
 
3. Research Hypotheses 
 
As previously discussed, existing theories provide predictions on the outlined considerations 
related to firm value, allowing for two different selection hypotheses.  
The first research question will be: 
Hypothesis 1: The CEO compensation is positively correlated with firm performance for 
high-technology companies in the short-term. 
Rejection of the null hypothesis would mean that the relative weight in terms of total 
compensation of each compensation component (such as salary, bonus, stock options and other 
compensations) are different goals for executives, as opposed to performance in the short-term. It 
might be argued that powerful incentive models are especially valuable for high value firms with 
high opportunities for growth that need to be decisively and vigorously pursued. It is possible that 
high value firms have CEOs interested in long-term performance and in obtaining personal 
benefits in terms of total compensation. It might be argued that powerful incentive models are 
especially valuable for high value firms with high opportunities for growth that need to be 
decisively and vigorously pursued. It might also be that high value firms are especially likely to 
attract star CEOs and pay gold parachutes. 
The second research question will be: 
Hypothesis 2: The CEO compensation is positively correlated with firm performance in 
high-technology companies in the long-term. 
It is possible that high value firms have CEOs with an interest in long-term performance and 
with obtaining personal benefits in terms of total compensation. With less intensity and yet more 
persistent than long-term compensation, bonuses and salary are determinant and in the same 
effect related to accounting performance. 
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4. Methodology, Sample, and Data Collection 
 
The sample chosen is the ExecuComp database, which was used to find the variables and to 
create a sample of firms between 2000 and 2010. The ExecuComp database provides yearly data 
on salary, bonus, stock options and restricted stock grants, as well as managerial stock and option 
holdings for top executives in firms within the Standard & Poor’s Index (S&P 1500). Firstly, to 
test this hypothesis, the following specification is presented of the balanced panel of high-
technology firms, between 2004 and 2010. High-Technology firms are the firms that operate in 
an industry with a four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code using the Fama and 
French classification of 48 industry groups (Fama & French, 1997). 
The ExecuComp database collects information about seven independent variables — total 
assets (ASSETS) and percentage change of assets (ASSETSCHG), employees (EMPL), total 
annual net sales (SALES) and yearly changes in sales (SALECHG), operating income before 
depreciation (OIBD), net income before extraordinary items and discontinued operation (NIBEX), 
earning per share (EPSEX) and return on assets (ROA) — and the independent, total compensation 
(TOTAL_COMP) cash compensation (CASH) variables are listed by each year and company. 
Several measurements were used in this study, such as control variables. Several measurements 
were used as control variables in this study. These include the number of employees, assets, 
increase in sales, net income, and the EPS, as a proxy of firm size, firm performance and wealth 
of the shareholder, which are the common predictors of executive pay. 
The High-Tech Dummy (DHTECH) is equal to one if the firm operates in an industry with a 
four-digit SIC code of 3570, 3571, 3572, 3576, 3577, 3661, 3674, 4812, 4813, 5045, 5961, 7370, 
7371, 7372, or 7373, instead of four-digit SIC codes, in the following industry groups: computer 
& office equipment, computer storage devices, communication terminals, equipment, peripheral 
equipment, NEC, telephone & telegraph apparatus, radiotelephone communications, telephone 
communications,  wholesale-computers & peripheral equipment & software, retail-catalog & 
mail-order houses, services-computer programming, data processing, services-computer 
programming services, services-prepackaged software and services-computer integrated systems 
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design.  
The main variable of the analysis is TOTAL_COMP and it is defined by the sum of the total 
compensations of the top executives in each company and it includes: salary, bonus, non-equity 
incentive plan compensation, grant-date fair value of option awards, grant-date fair value of stock 
awards, deferred compensation earnings reported as compensation, and other compensations.  
The table below identifies the updated variables that were used, including their definitions, 
measurement units and the expected signs, as reported by the theory. 
 
Table 1 - Executive Compensation Dependent and Independent Variables 
Name Expected variation Definition Units 
Ln (TOTAL_COMP) 
Total compensation 
 
Ln (the sum of the compensations of top executives includes: 
salary, bonus, non-equity incentive plan compensation, grant-date 
fair value of option awards, grant-date fair value of stock awards, 
deferred compensation earnings reported as compensation, and 
other compensations). 
Thousands 
Ln(CASH) 
Cash compensation 
 Ln (SALARY + Bonus) The dollar value of the base salary plus 
bonus earned by the named executive officer during the fiscal 
year 
. 
Thousands 
Ln (ASSETS)  (+) Ln (the total assets as reported by the company). Millions 
Ln (EMPL)  (+) Ln (employees, the total employees as reported by the company (#)). Thousands 
EPSEX  (-) EPS (Primary) excluding extraordinary items and discontinued operations.  
SALECHG (+) The year to year percentage change in Sales. Percentage 
Ln (OIBD)  (+) Ln (the operating income before depreciation as reported by the company). Millions 
ROA 
Return on assets 
(+) The Net Income Before Extraordinary Items and Discontinued 
Operations divided by Total Assets. This quotient is then 
multiplied by 100. 
Percentage 
Ln(COMMEQ) (+) The sum of Common Stock, Capital Surplus, Retained Earnings, 
and Treasury Stock adjustments. 
Millions 
(OIBD/ASSETS)*100 (+) Ln (the Operating Income Before Depreciation as reported by the 
company/Assets).This quotient is then multiplied by 100. 
Percentage 
Ln(SALES) 
Ln(NIBEX) 
(+) 
(+) 
Ln (The Net Annual Sales as reported by the company). 
Ln (the Net Income Before Extraordinary Items and Discontinued 
Operations). 
Millions 
Millions 
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SIC  Standard Industrial Classification Code.  
SPCODE (+) and (-) Current S&P Index membership 
"SP" = S&P 500 
"MD" = S&P Midcap Index 
"SM" = S&P Small cap Index 
"EX" = not on a major S&P Index 
  
    
To test the research hypotheses, two models were used with a different approach to total 
compensation.  The first is a total compensation model and the second is a total and cash 
compensation model. The first approach uses a dynamic model to explain total short- and long-
term compensations. The second model divides the components of total compensation and 
analyzes total compensation and cash in two equations, which are used as a measurement of 
short-term compensation.  
 
4.1 Total Compensation model 
 
The model presented below was used to test whether firm performance is relevant to ex-
plain executive compensation. Firstly, the model for the short-term: 
 
ln (TOTAL_COMP)it = a+ b1ln(ASSETS)it + b2ln(OIBD)it + b3ln(NIBEX)it + b4ln(EMPL)it + b5*ERPSEXit + 
b6*SALECHGit + uit          (1) 
 
and the secondly, the model for the long-term: 
ln (TOTAL_COMP)it = a + b1ln(ASSETS)it + b2ln(OIBD)it + b3ln(NIBEX)it + b4ln(EMPL)it + b5*ERPSEXit 
+ b6*SALECHGit + c*ln(TOTAL_COMP)it-1 +uit      (2) 
 
where, i and t represent the year and the company, respectively. 
The coefficient a is a constant denoting the base level from which the sum of the 
compensations of top executives vary according to the changes in performance variables. 
The panel data model is used as it is the most suitable way of studying a large set of 
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repeated observations and because it assesses evolution over time. With panel data it is possible 
to simultaneously explore several variations over time and between different individuals. The use 
of such models has increased immensely and, in fact, combining time and cross-sectional data 
brings many advantages: it is possible to use a larger number of observations and the degree of 
freedom in estimates increases, thus making statistical inferences more credible. At the same 
time, the risk of multicollinearity is reduced since the data in companies present different 
structures. Moreover, this model provides access to further information and the efficiency and 
stability of the estimators increase, while enabling the introduction of dynamic adjustments 
(Gujarati, 2004, 2000; William, 2002, 2003). 
According to Bebchuk et al. (2011), in order to test the variables and to assess the above-
mentioned research hypotheses there are independent variables that will possibly be used by the 
regression model to perform the estimation. At an empirical level, this analysis focuses on a sample 
of 500 high-tech companies in the S&P index (S&P500), for the period between 2004 and 2010, 
which constitutes a sample of 3,356 observations. 
 
Table 2 - Descriptive Statistics individual sample S&P500 
 
TOTAL_COMP ASSETS EPSEX OIBD NIBEX EMPL SALECHG DHTECH 
Mean 25,599.88 46,886.07 12.65983 3,249.064 1,215.441 46.30875 10.80346 0.121275 
Median 19,561.74 10,698.19 2.090000 1,296.557 507.4820 17.59400 7.909000 0.000000 
Maximum 264,964.7 2,264,909. 8,548.000 78,669.00 45,220.00 2,100.000 1,106.400 1.000000 
Minimum 454.4000 182.7430 -37.84000 -76735.00 -99289.00 0.053000 -92.68800 0.000000 
Std. Dev. 21,706.99 168,685.8 252.8151 6,878.305 3,586.554 110.5579 30.22776 0.326496 
Skewness 3.365542 8.450905 26.43878 4.478257 -3.906328 11.92814 15.95401 2.320283 
Observations 3,346 3,356 3,353 3,242 3,356 3,333 3,350 3,356 
 
The descriptive statistics of the variables for total CEO compensation in high-tech firms are 
presented in Table 2. In the S&P500, in the period between 2004 and 2010, there are about 12% 
of high-technology firms, and it is possible to observe that the group of top executives in each 
company has a total average compensation around USD 25,600 million. Another interesting 
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finding is that in this period there was not always an increase in sales, but there was a 10.8% 
average growth in high-tech companies. 
The regressions presented below (see table 3, and table 4) was estimated using the 
Generalized Least Squares (GLS) with a fixed effect model for time. This means that the 
regression coefficients which were used with the fixed effect model for explanatory variables do 
not vary over time. The estimation was conducted assuming that the company’s heterogeneity is 
captured in the constant part and that it differs between companies. The fixed effect model is the 
most suitable when there is a correlation between errors and variables (Greene, William, 2003).  
For each short- and long-term model two scenarios were tested to confirm and show the 
internal stability between them concerning the influence that high-technology firms have on the 
set of variables for total compensation. 
 
Table 3 - Total Executive Compensation Estimation  
Ln (TOTAL_COMP) Coefficient Prob.     Ln (TOTAL_COMP) Coefficient Prob.   
Constant 7,279,001 0.0000 
 
Constant 7,302,197 0.0000 
Ln(ASSETS) 0.054566 0.0002 
 
Ln(ASSETS) 0.054500 0.0002 
EPSEX -0.000620 0.0000 
 
Ln(ASSETS)*DHTECH 0.014395 0.0000 
Ln(OIBD) 0.204273 0.0000 
 
EPSEX -0.000619 0.0000 
Ln(NIBEX) 0.069080 0.0003 
 
Ln(OIBD) 0.200525 0.0000 
Ln(EMPL) 0.044388 0.0000 
 
Ln(NIBEX) 0.070401 0.0002 
SALECHG 0.002650 0.0000 
 
Ln(EMPL) 0.043644 0.0000 
DHTECH 0.140800 0.0000 
 
SALECHG 0.002667 0.0000 
Period fixed effects (dummy variables) 
  
Period fixed effects(dummy variables) 
 
 
Weighted Statistics 
  
Weighted Statistics 
R-squared 0.403318 
  
R-squared 0.402732 
 Adjusted R-squared 0.400693 
  
Adjusted R-squared 0.400104 
 S.E. of regression 0.553285 
  
S.E. of regression 0.553552 
 F-statistic 1,536,448 
  
F-statistic 1,532,713 
 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
  
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
 Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 2969   Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 2969 
 
In order to assess the abovementioned research hypotheses, the regression model was used 
and estimated with fixed effects. The first hypothesis for the positive influence of the CEO 
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compensation in firm performance is presented in Table 3. As it is possible to observe, the 
regressions are globally significant, with a 5% significance level. The following table presents 
the results of the estimation conducted by the generalized method using the fixed effect model for 
the studied data. The statistics are computed based on a panel data set of 484 firm-year 
observations, a total of about 2,969 companies that represent 14.08% of high-technology firms 
between 2004 and 2010. The total assets, the operating income before depreciation and the net 
income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations, the growth sales and 
employment, as reported by companies, are positive (see table 1 – expected variation) and 
significantly related to total executive compensations.  
 
Table 4 - Total Executive Compensation Estimation in long-term 
Ln (TOTAL_COMP) Coefficient Prob.     Ln (TOTAL_COMP) Coefficient Prob.   
Constant 3,372,131 0.0000 
 
Constant 3,379,249 0.0000 
Ln(TOTAL_COMP(-1)) 0.545348 0.0000 
 
Ln(TOTAL_COMP(-1)) 0.545797 0.0000 
Ln(ASSETS) 0.026126 0.0388 
 
Ln(ASSETS) 0.026164 0.0387 
EPSEX -0.000275 0.0000 
 
Ln(ASSETS)*DHTECH 0.006955 0.0177 
Ln(OIBD) 0.085650 0.0006 
 
EPSEX -0.000274 0.0000 
Ln(NIBEX) 0.029623 0.0787 
 
Ln(OIBD) 0.083758 0.0007 
Ln(EMPL) 0.021974 0.0086 
 
Ln(NIBEX) 0.030160 0.0733 
SALECHG 0.003060 0.0000 
 
Ln(EMPL) 0.021637 0.0096 
DHTECH 0.066078 0.0138 
 
SALECHG 0.003064 0.0000 
Period fixed effects (dummy variables) 
  
Period fixed effects (dummy variables) 
 
 
Weighted Statistics 
  
Weighted Statistics 
R-squared 0.606381 
  
R-squared 0.606318 
 Adjusted R-squared 0.604336 
  
Adjusted R-squared 0.604273 
 S.E. of regression 0.440828 
  
S.E. of regression 0.440872 
 F-statistic 2,966,106 
  
F-statistic 2,965,326 
 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
  
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
 Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 2517   Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 2517 
 
As expected, the EPS are negative and significantly related to total compensation in high-
tech companies. This indicates that there are no explicit contractual arrangements linking 
compensations and EPS. The performance ratio of firms measured by return has a negative 
influence. Note that around 40.4% (R2 = 0.404) of the variance in degree of CEO compensation 
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can be explained by the group of variables for the short-term (see Table 3). However, it is 
important to highlight that around 60.6% (R2 = 0.606) of variance in the degree of CEO 
compensation for the long-term can be explained by the group of variables (see Table 4). These 
indicate that the variables addressed here play a significant role in explaining executive 
compensation for short- and long-term periods, as stated by the Chi-Square test (P-value = 0). 
 
4.2 Total compensation and cash compensation models 
 
The two primary measurements of CEO compensation were used. The short-term 
compensation consisted of annual salary and bonus, which represents the total cash compensation 
received during a specific year. Annual salary and bonus for 2000 and 2010 (in thousands of 
dollars) were taken from the ExecuComp data set. The long-term compensation represents the 
equity-based compensation of a CEO, as reported by Frydman, C (2008). As she reported in the 
case study of General Electric, salary and bonus are defined as the level of salaries and current 
bonuses, both awarded and paid out during the year. Long-term bonus measures the amount paid 
out during the year according to long-term bonuses awarded in prior years. Total compensation is 
the sum of salary, bonus, long-term bonus and the Black–Scholes value of stock options granted 
(Frydman, 2009).  
Other dummy variables are used, such as YEAR for the period between 2000 and 2010. The 
main variables of the analysis in the system equation are T_COMP (defined by the sum of Salary, 
Bonus, Non-Equity Incentive Plan Compensation, Grant-Date Fair Value of Option Awards, 
Grant-Date Fair Value of Stock Awards, Deferred Compensation Earnings Reported as 
Compensation and Other Compensations) and CASH (Salary plus bonus) of all top executives in 
each company. The models introduced by the system equation presented below were used to test 
whether firm performance is relevant to explain executive compensation for the long and short-
term. Firstly, the model for the long-term, 
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Ln (T_COMP)ij = b11+ b12*ln(ASSETS) ij + b13*ASSETCHG ij + b14*ROAij+b15*ln(OIBD/ASSETS*100)ij+ 
b16*ln(SALES) ij +b17*ln(NIBEX)ij + +b18*ERPSEX ij +b19*SPCODE ij + b10*DHTECH ij+ 
b31*ln(COMMEQ)ij +∑ ∂j ∗ Yearj20102001  +  uij       (1) 
and for the short-term 
Ln (CASH)ij = b21+ b22*ln(ASSETS) ij + b23*ASSETCHG ij + b24*ROA ij + b25*ln(OIBD/ASSETS*100)ij + 
b26*ln(SALES) ij +b27*ln(NIBEX)ij + b29*SPCODE ij + b20*DHTECH ij+ b32*ln(COMMEQ)ij +∑ ∂j ∗20102001Yearj + vij           (2) 
 
Where i and j represent the year and the company, respectively. The coefficients b11 and b21 are 
constants denoting the base level from which the sum of the compensations of top executive 
varies according to the changes in performance variables. 
Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables observed for the firms of the 
S&P1500 during 2000-2010, which constitutes a sample of 15,265 observations. Some 
interesting outcomes were found as a result of this study.  
 
Table 5 - Descriptive statistics individual sample S&P 1500 
  
TOTAL_C
OMP 
CASH ROA NIBEX EPSEX SALES ASSETCHG ASSETS COMMEQ OIBD DHTECH 
 Mean  13727.19  4156.375  1.577071  288.9755  3.47042  5488.187  39.96929  15205.21  2714.774  1000.633  0.14415 
 Median  8089.794  2937.509  3.874000  58.40650  1.20000  1239.655  6.03400  1746.966  637.0890  176.3185  0.00000 
 Maximum  641446.2  199115.9  3551.351  45220.00  8548.00  425071.0  522050.0  3221972.  211686.0  124840.0  1.00000 
 Minimum  0.0000  0.0000 -10300.00 -99289.00 -231.670 -4,234.47 -99.4270  0.00000 -111403.0 -76735.00  0.00000 
 Std. Dev.  20478.12  5100.74  82.6438  2018.437  113.869  16956.91  3705.640  88055.59  9044.259  3833.163  0.35125 
 Skewness  8.7409  9.9984 -94.4612 -9.3868  55.3268  10.6209  140.802  15.88214  8.80257  9.601327  2.02623 
 Observ.  19678  19889  19869  19870  19842  19870  19855  19872  19872  19606  19889 
 
The descriptive statistics of the variables for total CEO compensation in high-tech firms are 
presented in Table 5. In the S&P1500, in the period between 2000 and 2010, there are about 
14.415% high-technology firms, and it is possible to observe that the group of top executives in 
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each company has an average total compensation around USD 13,727 million and earn around 
USD 4,156 million in cash. Another interesting finding is that, in this period and in this group of 
companies, there is an increase in assets and returns on assets around 39.96% and 1.57 %, 
respectively. 
To compare results of this model with the model presented in section 4.1, it was tested with 
the sample of the S&P 500 (see table 6) and then the sample was extended to the S&P1500 (see 
table 7) to understand the behavior in other dimensions of the firms.  
 
Table 6 - Total compensation and cash compensation estimations using the SUR method for S&P500  
 
Ln (T_COMP) Coefficient Prob.     Ln (CASH) Coefficient Prob.   
Constant 6.2794 0.000 
 
Constant 6.096 0.000 
Ln(ASSETS) 0.1748 0.000 
 
Ln(ASSETS) 0.198 0.000 
ASSETCHG 0.0011 0.000 
 
ASSETCHG 0.000 0.041 
ROA 0.0118 0.007 
 
ROA 0.007 0.066 
OIBD/ASSETS*100 0.0086 0.000 
 
OIBD/ASSETS*100 0.005 0.005 
Ln(SALES) 0.0855 0.000 
 
Ln(SALES) 0.054 0.000 
Ln(NIBEX) 0.0563 0.010 
 
Ln(NIBEX) 0.034 0.048 
EPSEX -0.0004 0.000 
 
-   
DHTECH 0.2927 0.000 
 
DHTECH -4.890 0.335 
Ln (COMMEQ) 0.0693 0.000 
 
-   
2001 -0.0126 0.784 
 
2001 -1.110 0.267 
2002 -0.0651 0.153 
 
2002 0.501 0.616 
2003 -0.0763 0.086 
 
2003 3.239 0.001 
2004 -0.0157 0.719 
 
2004 4.617 0.000 
2005 -0.0392 0.366 
 
2005 3.329 0.001 
2006 0.0240 0.574 
 
2006 -12.016 0.000 
2007 0.0531 0.214 
 
2007 -13.805 0.000 
2008 0.0161 0.714 
 
2008 -13.973 0.000 
2009 -0.0208 0.634 
 
2009 -13.646 0.000 
2010 0.0834 0.056 
 
2010 -13.890 0.000 
R-squared 0.3920 
  
R-squared 0.4280 
 Adjusted R-squared 0.3894 
  
Adjusted R-squared 0.4258 
 S.E. of regression 0.6069 
  
S.E. of regression 0.4964 
 Durbin-Watson stat 0.8438 
  
Durbin-Watson stat 0.5778 
 Included observations:4421     Included observations:4421   
 
42 
 
Operations and growth sales, as confirmed by this sample, are positive and significantly 
related to total executive. The system equation presented was estimated using the Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression (SUR) method. The SUR is a generalization of a linear regression model 
that consists of several regression equations, each having its own dependent variable and 
potentially different sets of exogenous explanatory variables. The main motivations for using the 
SUR are: improving estimation efficiency by combining information on different equations; and 
imposing and testing restrictions that involve parameters in different equations. The model can be 
estimated to each equation considering the interdependence of distribution (SUR). The SUR 
model can be further generalized into the multiple regressions, where the regressor on the right-
hand side can also function as endogenous variables. The multiple-equation model is a system of 
equations where the assumptions made for the single-equation model apply to each equation. The 
regression coefficient, year, does not vary over time because the estimation was conducted using 
dummy variables for year, and assuming that the company’s heterogeneity is captured in the 
constant part. (Greene, William, 2002).  
Almost all results are obtained when testing the model with the S&P 1500. A positive and 
significant relation is found between performance measured by return on assets related total and 
cash compensation and, as expected, the EPS are negative and significantly related to total 
compensation in high-tech companies. Note that around 39.2% (R2 = 0.392) of variance in the 
degree of total CEO compensation can be explained by the group of variables for the long-term, 
and it is important to highlight that there is around 42.8% (R2 = 0.428) of variance in degree of 
cash CEO compensation for the short-term (see Table 6). These results show that the variables 
addressed here play a significant role in explaining executive compensation for short- and long-
term periods, as stated by the Chi-Square test (P-value = 0). 
The first hypothesis for the positive influence of CEO compensation (total and cash 
compensation) on firm performance is presented in Table 7. As it is possible to observe, the 
regressions are globally significant, with a 5% significance level. The following table presents 
the results of the estimation for the studied data. 
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Table 7 - Total compensation and cash compensation estimations using the SUR method for S&P1500 – 
SM, MD and SP 
 
Ln (T_COMP) Coefficient Prob.     Ln (CASH) Coefficient Prob.   
Constant 6,022,018 0.0000 
 
Constant 5.941700 0.0000 
Ln(ASSETS) 0.072140 0.0000 
 
Ln(ASSETS) 0.123158 0.0000 
ASSETCHG 0.001383 0.0000 
 
ASSETCHG 0.000403 0.0000 
ROA 0.000859 0.1045 
 
ROA 0.000798 0.0385 
OIBD/ASSETS*100 0.007541 0.0000 
 
OIBD/ASSETS*100 0.003945 0.0000 
Ln(SALES) 0.143398 0.0000 
 
Ln(SALES) 0.135561 0.0000 
Ln(NIBEX) 0.111439 0.0000 
 
Ln(NIBEX) 0.053986 0.0000 
EPSEX -0.000400 0.0000 
 
-   
SPCODE=SP 0.057757 0.0001 
 
SPCODE=SP -0.046676 0.0000 
SPCODE=SM -0.167486 0.0000 
 
SPCODE=SM -0.016045 0.1047 
DHTECH 0.313173 0.0000 
 
DHTECH 0.011091 0.3353 
Ln (COMMEQ) 0.112421 0.0000 
 
-   
2001 0.010864 0.6572 
 
2001 -0.028642 0.1061 
2002 -0.045589 0.0611 
 
2002 0.051824 0.0033 
2003 -0.051240 0.0290 
 
2003 0.107735 0.0000 
2004 0.021421 0.3570 
 
2004 0.152258 0.0000 
2005 0.018350 0.4379 
 
2005 0.134210 0.0000 
2006 -0.007390 0.7480 
 
2006 -0.242996 0.0000 
2007 0.045311 0.0495 
 
2007 -0.306410 0.0000 
2008 0.051967 0.0328 
 
2008 -0.301458 0.0000 
2009 0.044238 0.0698 
 
2009 -0.283819 0.0000 
2010 0.151203 0.0000 
 
2010 -0.304708 0.0000 
R-squared 0.565742 
  
R-squared 0.547052 
 Adjusted R-squared 0.565137 
  
Adjusted R-squared 0.546487 
 S.E. of regression 0.624388 
  
S.E. of regression 0.455708 
 Durbin-Watson stat 0.950250 
  
Durbin-Watson stat 0.682381 
 Included observations: 15265     Included observations: 15265   
 
The statistics are computed based on a panel data set of 1,500 firm-year observations, a total of 
about 15, 625 companies that represent 14.415% of high-technology firms between 2000 and 
2010. They represent a difference around 31.31% in long-term compensation and about 11.1% in 
the short-term compensation. Other control financial performance measurements are used, such 
as total assets, operating income before depreciation, net income before extraordinary items and 
discontinued and cash compensations. It is important to highlight that around 56.57% (R2 = 
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0.5657) and 54.7% (R2 = 0.547) of the variance in degree of CEO compensation for each 
equation, respectively, can be explained by the group of variables (see Table 3). These indicate 
that the variables addressed here play a significant role in explaining executive compensation for 
short- and long-term periods, as stated by the Chi-Square test (p-value=0). 
In Table 7, the coefficient signs are similar in both specifications. However, the magnitudes 
of the coefficients are sensitive to the specification. As expected, earnings per share are negative 
and significantly related to total compensation for the long-term. This indicates that there are no 
explicit contractual arrangements linking compensations and earnings per share. The 
performance ratio of firms measured by return has a negative influence on CEO compensation 
(Young & Jing, 2011, Core et al., 2003b). 
A positive and statistically significant relationship was found between sales, asset growth 
and return on assets. Adding the same level of total CEO compensation and cash compensation 
(Gabaix & Landier, 2008) also empirically tests the relation between the level of pay and firm 
size. Log (assets), a variable proxy for firm size, is positively related to pay with a coefficient 
total compensation and cash compensation in the regression. When the adjustment is performed 
for the long-term compensation, it is possible to understand that when firm sizes are compared 
using the denominated current S&P index membership, S&P500 firms have an increase around 
5.7% and for the S&P small caps 600 there is a decrease around 16.7%, comparatively to the 
S&P Midcaps 400 firms. In terms of cash compensation, the S&P 500 firms are 4.7% below 
midcaps, and the S&P small caps 600 firms are 1.6% below, comparatively to the same group of 
S&P Midcaps 400 firms.  
S&P small caps 600 firms have less cash compensation and total compensation than S&P 
Midcaps 400 firms. Furthermore, S&P500 firms have more total compensation than S&P small 
caps 600 firms. However, the latter exhibit more cash compensation, which reflects a better 
contractual negotiation with firm performance efficiency or market conditions. 
Another finding is that the influence on CEO pay for the short-term between the year 2006 
and 2008 does not have the same meaning in long-term compensations. There is an increase 
around 5% for each year between 2007 and 2010, as opposed to the year 2000. Furthermore, 
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there is a decrease of about 30% in short-term incentives for the same period comparatively to the 
year 2000, which was possibly influenced by the beginning of the financial crisis, and it is not 
reflected in the long-term incentives. As Henry et al. (2011) suggest, CEO compensation 
increases the probability of effective internal controls after the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 
(Henry et al., 2011). Moreover, as expected, the increase in financial performance measurements, 
such as operating income before depreciation/assets and net income, has a double impact on the 
increase in long-term compensation, which is more positive than the increase in short-term 
compensations. 
 
5. Conclusion and Future Research 
 
The main purpose of this study was to examine whether the total remuneration paid to CEOs in 
high-technology firms in the S&P 500 and S&P 1500 is related to corporate finance. This work 
aims at contributing to explain the influence that performance has on CEO compensation for 
short- and long-term periods in these groups of companies. It was found that there is a strong and 
positive relation between CEO compensation and firm performance.  
In conclusion, according to the results that were obtained there is empirical evidence to state 
that in high-technology firms in the S&P, during the period between 2000 and 2010, performance 
determined total CEO compensation in short- and long-term periods together with accruals of 
financial performance measurements. Results suggest that high-tech firms tend to use more 
sophisticated performance measurements to determine CEO compensation. The method use here 
has potential implications in finance and accounting, for instance, where it is preferable to 
separately capture the specific effects of firm and performance. 
However, this work is not without limitations. This study focuses only on high-technology 
firms in the S&P in the period between 2000 and 2010. The definition of high-technology used in 
this study can be extended, as performed by Shim et al. (2009), and other important item 
measurements should be included, such as value of R&D expenditures, number of patents by firm 
and citation of patents (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2000, Shim et al., 2009). The level of R&D 
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expenditures and new product introductions are viewed as proxies for innovation, risk-taking and 
long-term decision-making, which are crucial to characterize high-technology firms. 
Furthermore, innovation constitutes an indispensable component of corporate strategies. For 
these reasons, the results of this study may not be generalized by other sectors due the specificity 
of high-tech firms. Additionally, the findings of this study could only be generalized to other 
sectors at an international level similarly to those in the research that was conducted. 
Furthermore, it will be necessary to focus on the comparison between high-technology firms 
from other sectors at an international level. 
In the future, it will be important to analyze other developments, such as the effect of 
managerial attributes for the short- and long-term in executive compensation (Graham et al., 
2012). Furthermore, it will also be important to desegregate the data sample for the period 
between 2000 and 2010 in order to broaden the period of analysis and to investigate the effect of 
the USA financial crisis, which started in 2007, and to understand the effectiveness of internal 
control structures under the 2002 Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX, Section 404) before and after 
implementation. 
Innovation constitutes an indispensable component of corporate strategies. For that, further 
considerations on innovation measurements may be incorporated in order to analyze the real 
motivation of the CEO. Further developments on this work will include new variables for the 
other research hypotheses, including returns to measure firm performance, firm expenditures on 
research and development, number of patents granted, and degree of openness. These variables 
and others may be the best proxies to measure the behavior of innovation and the link between 
executive compensation and firm performance. This paper will provide a better understanding of 
the relationship between compensation and performance in high-technology firms, something 
which is often discussed in the literature. 
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CHAPTER 3 
CEO compensation in high-tech firms and changes in the Financial 
Accounting Standard SFAS No 123 (R) 
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1. Introduction  
 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation became common in the late 1970s and early 
1980s and is often discussed in the literature ever since. Numerous stories have appeared recently 
in the financial press pointing out how many executives define contract remunerations. These 
news and striking reports have raised concerns on compensation. Nevertheless, no consensus 
view has emerged, and there is still much to learn about the determinants of CEO compensation. 
Appropriate incentives can be the tools in many cases, however, by basing compensation on 
changes in shareholder wealth. According to Graham (2012), managers often have better 
information than shareholders and boards in terms of identifying investment opportunities and 
assessing the profitability of potential projects. Furthermore, the fact that managers are expected 
to make higher investment decisions explains why shareholders relinquish decision rights over 
their assets by purchasing common stock (Graham, Li, & Qiu, 2012) . 
This study explores how the Financial Accounting Standards (FAS) Statement 123 (R) affects 
the performance determinants of CEO pays for long-term and short-term periods and points out 
the influence of high-tech firms. Furthermore, this paper examines how high-tech firms behave 
facing the cash based compensations and total CEO pays related to various performance 
measurements. The performance measurements pointed in this work are the usual accounting 
ratios of corporate finance.  
In 1990, Jensen and Murphy wrote that it is possible that CEO bonuses are strongly tied to 
an unexamined and/or unobservable performance measurement. When referring to the swings in 
CEO pay from year to year, the authors explain that the variations are consistent with the 
existence of an overlooked and yet important performance measurement, and that increase 
suggests that CEO pay is essentially unrelated to all relevant performance measurements (M. C. 
Jensen & Murphy, 1990, 1990b; K. J. Murphy, 1999). In many Standard & Poor´s (S&P) firms, 
employee stock option plans are an important component of employee remuneration. In 1999, 
94% of companies in the S&P 500 offered stock options to their top employees (Brian J. Hall & 
Murphy, 2002; K. J. Murphy, 1999). In order to better understand this argument, this study 
53 
 
investigates the relation between the CEO pay and the performance against high-technology 
firms with the balance cash compensation and total compensation. The combination of salary, 
incentives and bonuses is often referred to as cash compensation for executives. The CEO 
behavior is different when we think in short-term and long-term periods. The main goal of this 
paper is to provide a broader perspective on the relationship between CEO pay and firm 
performance and how high-technology can improve that performance while analyzing the 
behavior with the implementation of the SFAS 123 (R) and all its accounting rules underlying 
obligations. The change in the accounting treatment of stock-option compensation is exploited as 
well as the fair-value report under the SFAS 123 (R), which was issued by the Financial 
Accounting Standard Board (FASB) and entered into force in December 2005. This paper 
contributes to the under-studied empirical literature on the accounting treatment of equity-based 
compensation, influenced by the change in accounting rules and its influence on executive pay of 
high-tech firms. 
This work is organized as follows: Section 2 contains a revision of the main theories in 
the literature, as well as an analysis of accounting treatment of equity-based compensation before 
and after the SFAS 123 (R), an analysis on executive compensation in order to address agency 
problems and the income strategy impact on CEO compensation. Furthermore, this section 
examines the appropriate measurements for corporate financial performance in high-technology 
firms. Section 3 explains the research hypotheses and section 4 presents the methodology, sample 
and data collection for the regression estimation, as well as the results of the econometric model 
to assess the influence that firm performance has on executive compensation before and after 
SFAS 123 (R). Lastly, the main conclusions are discussed, as well as some limitations and new 
perspectives for future research. 
 
2. Literature review 
 
Based on the literature, a study was conducted in order to understand CEO compensation in 
high-technology firms. 
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2.1 Accounting treatment of equity-based compensation before and after SFAS 123 (R)   
 
In December 2004, FASB issued the FASB Statement No. 123 (revised 2004), Accounting for 
Stock-Based Compensation, to amend and replace the Financial Accounting Standards Statement 
No 123, which became mandatory for all firms toward the end of 2005 and supersedes the APB 
Opinion No. 25, Accounting for Stock Issued to Employees. Statement 123 as originally issued in 
1995, which established that a fair-value-based method of accounting for share-based payment 
transactions with employees was preferable. The SFAS 123 (R) requires the use of a fair value 
accounting method to compute the value of option compensation. A similar approach is followed 
by international standards International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS2) that states the 
same principle. Both standards require employee stock option to be recognized as an expense and 
measured at the fair value of the employee stock option determined at the time of grant. 
Prior to implementing the SFAS 123 (R), firms were required to report compensation expense 
due to stock options in an amount equal to the excess of the stock price at the grant date over the 
exercise price. This is allowed to as the intrinsic value method. Most options have an exercise 
price at least equal to the grant date stock price and so this method did not usually result in an 
expense reported on the income statement. In the originally issued SFAS 123, a company could 
choose to either report in its income statement the stock compensation expense calculated per the 
fair value method or the stock compensation expense calculated per the intrinsic value method 
and disclosing the impact in their footnotes. The SFAS 123 (R) covers a wide range of share-
based compensation arrangements including share options, restricted share plans, performance 
based awards, share appreciation rights, and employee share purchase plans. 
The SFAS 123 (R) leads to greater expenses as it increases the overall conservatism income. 
According  to Heltzer (2010), different forms of conservatism have different implications on the 
quality of income. The author found that the SFAS 123 (R) causes an increased negative relation 
between economic gains and income, but it is mix on the quality of earnings in terms of 
conservatism (Heltzer, 2010). Since the publication of the SFAS 123(R) Share-Based Payment, 
which eliminates the alternative of using the intrinsic value based method, the IFRS and the US 
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GAAP have similar requirements for accounting for share-based payments. With this statement, 
the convergence between the IFRS in Europe and the GAAP in the US started. 
 
2.2  Executive compensations to address agency problems and the income strategy impact 
 
The general acceptance of the agency theory and the parallel research on executive 
compensation began in the early 1980s. It was the evolution of the modern corporation with 
ownership separation and control that undermined the agency theory.  Early studies in this area 
focused on documenting the relation between CEO pay and firm performance. The discussion of 
executive compensation must proceed with the fundamental agency problem afflicting 
management decision-making as background. According to Jensen and Murphy (1990), there is 
an optimal contracting approach, which is when boards use design compensation schemes to 
maximize shareholder value with efficient incentives (M. C. Jensen & Murphy, 1990). To 
connect the agency problem and the executive compensation, the authors use the managerial 
power approach when this connection is seen as an integral part of the agency problems. It is 
important to remember that the principal-agent problems treat the difficulties that arise under 
conditions where information is incomplete and asymmetric whenever a principal hires an agent 
(Murphy, 1999, Eisenhardt (1989); Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Fried (2003)). Furthermore, the 
agency theory aims at solving two problems that can occur in agency relationships. The first is 
the desires or goals of the principal and agent conflict and it is difficult or expensive for the 
principal to verify what the agent is actually doing. The problem is that the principal is unable to 
check if the agent has behaved correctly. Secondly, it is the problem of risk sharing facing the 
different attitudes toward risk, because the principal and the agent have different actions 
according to different risk preferences (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Hall and Liebman (1998) argue that the solution to the agency problem is aligning the 
incentives of executives with the interests of shareholders by granting (or selling) stock and stock 
options to the CEOs. The CEOs have the correct incentives on every margin, including effort, 
perquisites and project choice, and support that the optimal contract is a one-to-one 
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correspondence between firm value and CEO pay (Brian J. Hall & Liebman, 1998). In their 
work, Hall and Liebman (1998) conclude that the relationship between pay and performance is 
much larger than has previously been recognized, and that this includes both gains and losses in 
CEO wealth. The salary and bonus vary so little because corporate board members are often 
reluctant to reduce CEO pay, even in response to poor performance and that may attract 
unwanted media attention. Using salary and bonuses to reward and penalize CEOs may only be 
possible to create high-powered incentives that align CEO pay with shareholder objectives (Hall 
and Liebman, 1998). A large part of the executive pay literature argues that compensation and 
managerial interests should be aligned with shareholder interests in order to solve agency 
problems (see, for example, the surveys by Murphy and by Core et al. (2003a). 
Equity-based compensation is widely documented in the research examining pay versus 
performance. M. Jensen and Meckling (1976), Murphy (2003) and Jensen (2004) state that the 
increase in stock options pay is the result of the boards’ inability to evaluate the true cost of this 
form of compensation. The use of equity-based compensation is encouraged by all stakeholders, 
such as investors, regulators and academics. The controversy over CEO compensation reflects a 
perception that CEOs effectively set their own pay levels. In most companies, the last decisions 
over executive pay are made by members outside the board of directors who are keenly aware of 
the conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders over the level of pay. However, the 
CEOs and other top managers exert at least some influence on the level and on the structure of 
their pay (K. J. Murphy, 1999). 
In recent years, the use of restricted stocks in compensation executives has increased and has 
been widely criticized when these executives received dividend equivalents on restricted stocks 
before the vesting period. Agency cost benefits of dividend equivalent rights argue that this 
practice helps executives focus on the business, and rewards them for managing the business to 
produce cash. Therefore, this is encouraged because it is a way of distributing dividends by 
shareholders (Akpotaire, 2011).  
The SFAS 123 (R) is a change in accounting policy and represents an exogenous shock to the 
accounting benefits, and restricts the choice of accounting principles by managers (Zmijewski & 
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Hagerman, 1981). There are economic incentives to determine and motivate the managers’ 
concern with a set of accounting principal utilized to generate the firms’ financial statements. 
Under economic factors which influence the decision, managers will attempt to archive the 
optimal reported net income over time and will choose a set of income policies according to 
theirs goals. There are many variables that induce managers to use deflating policies while other 
variables encourage managers to choose income inflating solutions. That infers a conservative or 
liberal firm income strategy. This trade-off means that any combination of Generally Accepted 
Accounting Practice (GAAP) variables may be optimal for each firm. However, the SAF 123(R) 
prevents this income strategy by the imposing and restricting some variables as accounting 
treatment of stock-options compensation and the fair-value report. In their study, Zmijewski and 
Hagerman (1981) suggest that individual accounting choice decisions are part of an overall firm 
strategy and applicable in larger firms and in more concentrated industries. In this sense, 
Matsunaga (1995) suggests that some change in the financial reporting of treatment of stock 
options, as proposed by the FASB, is likely to reduce the use of the employees’ stock option for 
some firms (Matsunaga, 1995). 
 
2.3  Financial performance in high-technology firms 
 
This chapter provides an analysis on the different forms of measuring performance in high-
tech firms and how these engage to the level of CEO pay. The behavior of high-tech firms and its 
contribution to CEO compensation for the short- and long-term are also analyzed. This is 
consistent with Shim (2009), who argues that it is possible to confirm that high-tech firms that 
depend more on managing assets are more successful. Some of these assets are technology 
innovation, continuous improvement, software development and knowledge-based management. 
High-tech firms must continuously innovate to survive and to sustain their growth (Shim et al., 
2009). In high-technology firms it is possible to find innovation, R&D investments and some 
assets with an essential competitive advantage and there are, at the same time, some risks. 
Different R&D spending in the firms is indicative of a large variance in the firms’ performance. 
High-tech investment is particularly important because the returns on high-tech investment are 
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skewed and highly uncertain, in part because R&D projects have a low probability of succeeding 
financially. Another reason is the existing asymmetry in information shared between firms and 
potential investors. This happens because it is difficult to increase high-tech investments and 
often insiders will have much better information than outsiders about the prospects of the firm's 
investments. Moreover, as pointed out by Makri, Lane and Gomez-Mejia, to engage in innovative 
projects leading to innovations the incentive schemes play a pivotal role in inducing senior 
organizational managers. Furthermore, to secure the stream of innovations a firm needs to 
enhance its economic performance with a proper pay scheme to encourage executives (Makri, 
Lane, & Gomez-Mejia, 2006). The study by Gomez-Mejia et al. (2000) was taken into 
consideration in this paper, especially their conclusion that high-technology industry executives 
may be more rewarded for innovation activity than for the firm’s financial performance. The 
executive incentives induce higher risk and cannot bear the associated financial risk as a 
consequence of those actions (Gomez-Mejia, Gideon, & Balkin, 2000). 
In summary, it was found that firms are subjected to the agency problem in which the CEO 
may not work in favor of the shareholders to maximize their wealth by improving firm 
performance. Furthermore, the decisions related to CEO compensation are based on the firms’ 
accounting and finance performance. Therefore, the change in the rules of the SFAS 123 (R) 
forces managers to make decisions and to overtake the limitations of their income goals. 
 
 
2.4 Developing a hypothesis  
 
The role that accounting plays on CEO compensation in high-tech firms is still little known. 
Some possibilities have been identified to find some relations with pay compensation and to 
understand how it is possible to improve firm performance and in turn the shareholder wealth. As 
previously discussed, existing theories provide predictions on the outlined considerations related 
to firm performance, allowing for two different selection hypotheses.  
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The first research question, that the CEO compensation for the long-term is determinant and 
positively related to firm performance. High-technology companies support and enhance this 
evidence.  Rejecting the null hypothesis would mean that the relative weight in terms of total 
compensation of each compensation component (such as salary, bonus, stock options and other 
compensations)are different goals for executives, as opposed to performance for the short-term. It 
is possible that high value firms have CEOs are interested in long-term performance and in 
obtaining personal benefits in terms of total compensation. It might be argued that powerful 
incentive models are especially valuable for high value firms with high opportunities for growth 
that need to be decisively and vigorously pursued. It might also be that high value firms are 
especially likely to attract star CEOs and pay gold parachutes. Furthermore, the CEO 
compensation for the short-term is determinant and positively correlated with firm performance. 
With less intensity and yet more persistent than long-term compensation, bonuses and salary are 
determinant and in the same effect related to accounting performance. Hypotheses 1a and 1b are 
formulated accordingly. 
Hypothesis 1a: CEO compensation in high-technology firms is positively related to firm 
performance for the long-term. 
Hypothesis 1b: CEO compensation in high-technology firms is positively related to firm 
performance for the short-term. 
The second question is the SFAS 123 (R) has an influence on CEO compensation in high-
technology firms. Human capital intensive industries rely heavily on stock options as 
compensation relatively to other firms. The impact of fair value reporting is examined for stock 
option compensation on their income statements and on CEO compensation. In line with this, 
hypothesis 2 is formulated.  
Hypothesis 2: CEO compensation in high-technology firms is positively related to firm 
performance after the implementation of the SFAS 123 (R). 
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The purpose of this paper is to examine this impact on CEO compensation. The effect on 
CEO compensation is analyzed for the long- and short-term using high-tech firm performance 
before and after SFAS 123 (R) implementations. 
 
3. Empirical approach 
 
The models introduced by the system equation presented below were used to test whether 
firm performance is relevant to explain executive compensation for the long- and short-term. 
Firstly, the model for the long-term, 
Ln (T_COMP)ij= β11 + β12*ln(ASSETS)ij + β13*ΔASSETSij + β 14*ROAij  + 
β15*ln(OIBD/ASSETS*100)ij+ β 16*ln(SALES) ij + β17*ln(NIBEX)ij + β18*ERPSEX ij + 
β19*SPCODE ij + β10*DHTECH ij+ β31*ln(COMMEQ)ij + β∑ 𝜕𝜕 ∗ 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝜕20102001  +  uij 
and for the short-term 
Ln (CASH)ij = β21+ b22*ln(ASSETS) ij + β23*ΔASSETSij + β 24*ROAij + 
β25*ln(OIBD/ASSETS*100)ij +  β26*ln(SALES)ij + β27*ln(NIBEX)ij + β29*SPCODEij + 
β20*DHTECHij + β32*ln(COMMEQ)ij  + β∑ 𝜕𝜕 ∗ 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝜕20102001  + vij 
 
Where, i and j represent the year and the company, respectively. The coefficients β11 and β21 
are constants denoting the base level from which the sum of the compensations of top executive 
varies according to the changes in performance variables. The table 1 below identifies the 
variables that were used, including their definitions, measurement units and expected signs, as 
reported in the theory. 
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Table1 – Executive compensation dependent and independent variables 
 
The High-Tech Dummy (DHTECH) is equal to one if the firm operates in an industry with a 
four-digit SIC code of 3570, 3571, 3572, 3576, 3577, 3661, 3674, 4812, 4813, 5045, 5961, 7370, 
7371, 7372, or 7373, instead of four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes (Fama & 
French, 1997). Other dummy variables are used, YEAR for the period between 2000 and 2010.  
Name Definition Units 
 
T_COMP 
 
The sum of the compensations of top executives includes: Salary, Bonus, 
Non-Equity Incentive Plan Compensation, Grant-Date Fair Value of 
Option Awards, Grant-Date Fair Value of Stock Awards, Deferred 
Compensation Earnings Reported as Compensation, and Other 
Compensations. 
 
Thousands 
CASH 
 
ROA 
Salary + Bonus The dollar value of the base salary plus bonus earned by 
the named executive officer during the fiscal year. 
Return on assets. The Net Income Before Extraordinary Items and 
Discontinued Operations divided by Total Assets. This quotient is then 
multiplied by 100. 
Thousands 
 
Percentage 
ASSETS The Total Assets as reported by the company. Millions 
ΔASSETS The year to year percentage change in Total Assets. Percentage 
COMMEQ The sum of Common Stock, Capital Surplus, Retained Earnings, and 
Treasury Stock adjustments. 
Millions 
EPSEX  Earnings per Share (Primary) Excluding Extraordinary Items and 
Discontinued Operations. 
 
(OIBD/ASSETS)*100 The Operating Income Before Depreciation/Assets as reported by the 
company. This quotient is then multiplied by 100. 
Percentage 
NIBEX The Net Income Before Extraordinary Items and Discontinued Operations. Millions 
SALES The Net Annual Sales as reported by the company. Millions 
SIC Standard Industrial Classification Code.  
SPCODE Current S&P Index membership 
"SP" = S&P 500 
"MD" = S&P Midcap Index 
"SM" = S&P Small cap Index 
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The proxies for financial reporting concerns expand on variables used prior to research by 
encompassing corporate performance and CEO compensation documented in the literature. 
Earnings per share (EPS) are a popular performance metric used in executive compensation 
contracts (Murphy 1999, 2000). As it is commonly known, this ratio is influenced and directly 
punished by the increase in restricted stocks and dividend equivalents. Compensation contracts 
that tie managerial rewards to EPS create explicit incentives for executives to manage the EPS. 
Young and Jing (2011) argue that there is a net benefit to shareholders in executive compensation 
contracts when they use stock repurchases by EPS targets (Young & Jing, 2011). Additionally, if 
stock options are a sub-optimal incentive contract, Sesil et al. (2006) expect that, in terms of  firm 
performance, there will be a decrease in earnings or an increase in earnings with a reduction in 
the rate of return on assets (Sesil, Lin, & Director, 2006). 
The use of options at executive level associated with an increase in performance is not clear 
in the literature. Some argue that it is associated with a higher profit and output (Core et al., 
2003a), while others state the opposite (Brian J. Hall & Murphy, 2002). The use of stock options 
reduces the agency cost and incentive to maximize value creation for shareholders, and 
encourages risk taking, and then accounting is shown by measuring corporate finance (Sesil et 
al., 2006). They argue that adopting stock options has an impact on firm financial performance to 
increase operating income (OI) and investments in assets. However, there will be a significant 
decrease in return on assets (ROA). Others who have previously conducted research on stock 
options have focused on pay-for-performance elasticity (Brian J.  Hall & Murphy, 2003), while 
others have focused more on the determinants of share-based adoption (Core, Guay, & Larcker, 
2003). The adoption of stock options is associated with higher growth in income, but to a 
significantly lower return on assets (ROA), which is evidence that options promote sub-optimal 
over investment. 
The company’s measurements are consistent with vision, mission and strategies for long-term 
performance and the financial criteria to monitor CEO compensation (Epstein & Roy, 2005). 
Usually in the USA the compensation programs combine incentives for short- and long-term 
periods with a set of performance measurements.  
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For these reasons, and because this subject is pertinent, it is interesting to examine these 
issues using these performance measurements and to contribute to enrich research in this area, 
improving the understanding on CEO compensation how and that influence before and after 
SFAS 123 (R) implementations. 
 
4. Data and summary statistics 
 
The chosen database was the ExecuComp, which was used to find the variables and to create 
a sample of firms between 2000 and 2010. The ExecuComp database provides yearly data on 
salary, bonus, stock option and restricted stock grants, as well as managerial stock and option 
holdings for top executives in firms within the Standard & Poor’s Index (S&P 1500).To test this 
hypothesis, the following specification is run on the balanced panel of high-technology firms. 
High-Technology firms are the firms that operate in an industry with a four-digit SIC code of 
3570, 3571, 3572, 3576, 3577, 3661, 3674, 4812, 4813, 5045, 5961, 7370, 7371, 7372, or 7373,  
using the Fama and French classification of 48 industry groups, instead of four-digit Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) codes (Fama & French, 1997). 
According to Lucian A. Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2011), in order to test the variables 
and to assess the abovementioned research hypotheses there are independent variables that will 
possibly be used by the regression model to perform the estimation. The total compensation and 
cash compensation are analyzed depending on some firm performance metrics.  
At an empirical level, this analysis focuses on a sample of 1500 companies in the Standard & 
Poor's (stock market index based on the common stock prices) index (S&P1500), for the period 
between 2000 and 2010, which constitutes a sample of about 19800 observations. The SFAS 123 
(R) was beginning of the first annual reporting period after December 15, 2005. Thus, all firms’ 
observations during 2006 were excluded because this is a transition year and the quality of the 
statements is lower. After this restriction, the final sample comprises 1500 firm-year observations 
with 2000-2005 as the period before SFAS 123 (R) and 2007-2010 as the period after SFAS 123 
(R). 
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The ExecuComp database collects information on seven independent variables – Assets and 
year to year percentage change of assets (ΔASSETS), sales, operation income before depreciation 
(OIDB), net items and discontinued operation (NIBEX), earning per share (EPSEX), The sum of 
Common Stock Capital Surplus (COMMEQ), net annual sales (SALES) – and dependent total 
compensation (T_COMP) and cash compensation (CASH) variables are listed by each year and 
company. Several measurements were used in this study, such as control variables. These include 
assets, increase in sales, the net Income and the earning per share, as a proxy of firm size, firm 
performance and shareholder wealth, the common predictors of executive pay. The two primary 
measurements of CEO pay were used. The short-term compensation consisted of annual salary 
and bonus, which represents the total cash compensation received during a specific year. Annual 
salary and bonus for 2000 and 2010 (in thousands of dollars) were taken from the ExecuComp 
data set. The long-term compensation represents the equity-based compensation of a CEO, as 
reported by Frydman (2009). As she reported in the case study of General Electric, salary and 
bonus are defined as the level of salaries and current bonuses, both awarded and paid out 
throughout the year. Long-term bonus measures the amount paid out during the year according to 
long-term bonuses awarded in prior years. Total compensation is the sum of salary, bonus, long-
term bonus and the Black–Scholes value of stock options granted (Frydman, 2009).   
The main variables of the analysis in the system equation are T_COMP (defined by the sum 
of salary, bonus, non-equity incentive plan compensation and other compensations) and CASH 
(Salary plus bonus) of all top executives in each company. Table 2 presents the descriptive 
statistics and correlations for variables used in the CEO compensation analysis. Some interesting 
outcomes were found as a result of this study. 
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Table 2 - Descriptive statistics and correlations for the sample of 1500 S&P over the period 2000-
2010Table2 - Descriptive statistics and corr 1 
 
 
 
 
Variable Mean Median Min Max Stdev N
T_COMP 13,727.19 8,089.79 0 641,446.20 20,478.12 19678
CASH 4,156.38 2,937.51 0 199,115.90 5,100.74 19889
ASSETS 15,205.21 1,746.97 0 3,221,972.00 88,055.59 19872
Δ ASSETS 39.96 6.03 -99.43 522,050.00 3,705.64 19855
ROA 10.79 11.54 -1,000.00 138.87 76.41 19563
OIBD 1,000.63 176.32 -76,735.00 124,840.00 3,833.16 19606
SALES 5,488.19 1,239.66 -4,234.47 425,071.00 16,956.91 19870
NIBEX 2,889.75 58.41 -99,289.00 42,220.00 2,018.44 19870
EPSEX 3.47 1.2 -231.67 8,548.00 113.87 19842
COMMEQ 2,714.77 637.08 -111,403.00 211,686.00 9,044.26 19842
DHTECH 0.144 - - - - 18889
Panel A: Descriptive statistics - Full time period
Variable Mean Median Stdev N Mean Median Stdev N T-Test j Med Chi-Squa
T_COMP 13,635.58 7,440.77 23,140.38 10687 13,762.41 8,973.70 16,254.54 7156 (-0,402) (100,22)***
CASH 4,751.23 3,352.65 5,594.83 10854 3,357.93 2,630.00 3,877.08 7159 (18,362)*** (502,02)***
ASSETS 13,008.18 1,491.48 64,758.39 10837 18,230.98 2,104.52 114,006.40 7159 (-3,909)*** (101,94)***
Δ ASSETS 65 7.04 5,019.63 10820 8.56 4.18 36.72 7159 (-0,951) (153,64)***
ROA 10.67 11.68 98.73 10571 10.61 11.26 39.15 7124 (-0,040) (7,75)***
OIBD 899.67 165.58 3,197.82 10571 11,101.00 190 4,445.22 7159 (-3,506)*** (15,35)***
SALES 4,822.67 1,127.75 14,207.38 10835 6,367.19 1,430.13 20,034.76 7159 (-6,047)*** (56,15)***
NIBEX 256.65 51.98 1,525.50 10835 287.62 63.7 2,612.11 7159 (-1,002) (25,26)***
EPSEX 3.11 1.17 94.12 10807 3.41 1.17 124.22 7159 (-0,186) (-0,001)
COMMEQ 2,350.08 559.15 7,136.89 10837 3,182.20 753 1,153.48 7159 (-6,102)*** (100,43)***
DHTECH 0.148 - - 10854 0.141 - - 7159 - -
 Pre SFAS 123 (R)  Post SFAS 123 (R) Difference
 Panel B: Descriptive statistics  pre and post SFAS 123 (R)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 T_COMP 1
2 CASH 0.559 1
3 ASSETS 0.305 0.391 1
4 Δ ASSETS -0.002 -0.004 -0.004 1
5 ROA 0.013 0.013 -0.002 -0.004 1
6 OIBD 0.398 0.432 0.003 -0.001 0.01 1
7 SALES 0.354 0.333 0.476 -0.002 0.008 0.749 1
8 NIBEX 0.195 0.176 0.205 -0.001 0.016 0.61 0.475 1
9 EPSEX -0.009 -0.009 0.049 0 0.001 0.082 0.1 0.103 1
10 COMMEQ 0.409 0.387 0.631 -0.001 0.002 0.724 0.685 0.573 0.2 1
Pearson´s correlations in bold are significant at the 0,05 level
Panel C : Correlation
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The descriptive statistics of the variables for total compensation and cash compensation for 
high-tech firms are presented in Table 2. Panel A of table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the 
full sample. The firms in the sample are large with a mean of 15,201.20 million USD and median 
assets of 1,746.97 million USD. 
In the S&P1500, before and after SFAS (R), for the period between 2000 and 2010, there are 
about 14.415% high-technology firms, and it is possible to observe that the group of top 
executives in each company has an average total compensation around 13,727 million USD and 
earn in cash around 4,156 million USD. Other interesting finding is that, in this period and in this 
group of companies, and consistent with the overall economic growth, there is an increase in 
assets and returns on assets around 39.96% and 10.79 %, respectively. Panel B of Table 2 reports 
the same descriptive statistic partitioned by time period. Consistent with the overall economic 
growth, it is possible to observe that almost all firm performance measurements increase in the 
period after SFAS 123 (R). Total compensations maintain an average around 13,727 million USD 
(value for full period) for the periods before and after SFAS 123 (R). The same cannot be said 
about the compensation for the short-term as variable cash presents a significant decrease in 
value after SFAS 123 (R). Panel C of table 2 presents correlations between variables. The 
performance variables, such as assets, return on assets, operating income, sales and the common 
stocks, are positively correlated with total compensation and for the short-term they are positively 
correlated with operating income and sales with cash. 
 
5. Results  
 
Using the sample presented above suggests that accounting played a significant role in the 
high-tech firms’ choice of equity compensation. The panel data model is used because it is the 
most suitable way of studying a large set of repeated observations and due to the fact that it 
assesses evolution over time. With panel data it is possible to simultaneously explore several 
variations over time and between different individuals. The use of such models has increased 
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immensely and, in fact, combining time and cross-sectional data brings many advantages: it is 
possible to use a larger number of observations and the degree of freedom in estimates increases, 
thus making statistical inferences more credible. At the same time, the risk of multicollinearity is 
reduced since the data in companies present different structures. Moreover, this model provides 
access to further information and the efficiency and stability of the estimators increase, while 
enabling the introduction of dynamic adjustments (Gujarati, 2004; William, 2003). 
The results are presented in table 3 and in Panel A the regression with full sample is analyzed 
in order to test the first hypothesis; the second hypothesis is tested in Panels B and C.  
As expected, there is a significant and positive correlation between performance variables and 
total compensation (T_COMP) and between them and the short-term compensation presented by 
cash. Therefore, it is possible to state that firm performance measured by assets, return on assets, 
sales and net income have a positive influence on the executive compensation for long- and 
short–term periods.  
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Table 3 - Total compensation and cash compensation estimations using the SUR method Table 3 - 
Results oompensat 1 
Dependent 
variable 
Prediction 
Sign 
Panel A - full sample Panel B - Pre SFAS 123(R) Panel C - Post SFAS 123(R) 
Ln_T_COMP Ln_CASH Ln_T_COMP Ln_CASH Ln_T_COMP Ln_CASH 
        Ln_ASSETS + 0.069 0.1202 0.0616 0.108 0,071 0,121 
 
 
(7,142)*** (18,82)*** (4,413)*** (12,36)*** (4,987)*** (12,42)*** 
Ln_Δ ASSETS + 0.001 0.0004 0.0001 0.0004 0,001 0,0003 
  
(10,234)*** (4,090)*** (8,867)*** (3,46)*** (5,189)*** (2,37)** 
ROA + 0.007 0.004 0.0102 0.005 0,006 0,0002 
 
 
(9,061)*** (6,643)*** (8,163)*** (6,592)*** (5,013)*** (2,93)*** 
Ln_SALES + 0.142 0.134 0.1238 0.168 0,157 0,090 
  
(20,241)*** (26,83)*** (12,173)*** (11,53)*** (15,22)*** (11,54)*** 
Ln_NIBEX + 0.115 0.057 0.123 0.088 0,084 0,018 
  
(14,897)*** (10,49)*** (10,81)*** (11,53)*** (7,726)*** (2,258) 
EPSEX - -0.0003 
 
-0.0003 
 
~0,004  
 
 
(-11,75)*** 
 
(-6,26)*** 
 
(-8,866)***  
Ln_COMMEQ + 0.111 
 
0.157 
 
0,068  
  
(12,62)*** 
 
(12,42)*** 
 
(5,326)***  
DHTECH + 0.314 0.0119 0.449 0.053 
0.1520 -0,063 
 
 
(19,67)*** (1,038)*** (19,05)*** (3,345)*** (6,681)*** (-3,654)*** 
SP  + / - 0.057 -0.047 0.0198 -0.033 0.1401 -0,015 
  
(3,908)*** (0-4,444)*** (0,967) (-2,395)** (6,113)*** (-0,912) 
SM  + / - -0.167 -0.016 -0.1531 -0.046 -0.207 -0,054 
  
(-12,30)*** (-1,633) (-7,536)*** (-3,321)*** (.10,44)*** (-3,596)*** 
Year = 2001  + / - 0.0108 -0.029 0,020 -0,020   
  
(0,443) (-1,618) (0,787) (-1,182)   
Year = 2002  + / - -0.045 0,052 -0,035 0,061   
  
(-1,865)** (2,946)** (-1,376) (3,478)***   
Year = 2003  + / - -0.0504 0,108 -0,047 0,115   
  
(-2,148)** (6,342)*** (-1,884)* (6,714)***   
Year = 2004  + / - 0.0214 0,152 0,019 0,150   
  
(0,921) (8,995)*** (0,770) (8,841)***   
Year = 2005  + / - 0.0183 0,134 0,012 0,120   
  
(0,776) (7,790)*** (0,470) (6,960)***   
Year = 2006  + / - -0.0072 -0,243     
  
(-0314) -14,559)***     
Year = 2007  + / - .00454 -0,306   
 
 
  
(1,969)* (-18,217)***   
 
 
Year = 2008  + / - 0.0521 -0,301   0,001 0,007 
  
(2,140)* (-16,968)***   (0,068) (0,439) 
Year = 2009  + / - 0.0445 -0,208   -0,006 0,019 
  
(1,824)* (-15,962)***   (-0,288) (1,203) 
Year = 2010  + / - 0.1514 -0,305   0,111 0,010 
    (6,229)*** (.17,208)***     (5,374)*** (0,686) 
Adj R2 0.565 0.546 0.538 0.603 0.611 0.443 
N 15109 15265 8103 8223 5433 5435 
        T-Statistics are reported  in parenthesis below the coefficient and White´s corrected for heteroskedasticity *, **, *** indicate significance 
at the 0,10, 0,05 and 0,01 level, respectly 
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A system equation was used for the dependent variables natural logarithm of total 
compensation (Ln_T_COMP) and natural logarithm of cash compensation (Ln_CASH), which 
are explained by performance measurement for long- and short-term periods. The system 
equation presented was estimated using the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) method. The 
SUR is a generalization of a linear regression model that consists of several regression equations, 
each having its own dependent variable and potentially different sets of exogenous explanatory 
variables. The main motivations for using the SUR are: improving estimation efficiency by 
combining information on different equations; and imposing and testing restrictions that involve 
parameters in different equations. The model can be estimated for each equation considering the 
interdependence of distribution. The SUR model can be further generalized into the multiple 
regressions, where the variables on the right-hand side can also function as endogenous variables. 
The multiple-equation model is a system of equations where the assumptions made for the single-
equation model apply to each equation. The regression coefficient, year, does not vary over time 
because the estimation was conducted using dummy variables for year, and assuming that the 
company’s heterogeneity is captured in the constant part (William, 2003).  
The results in table 3 reflect the estimation of equations (1) and (2). Panel A is consistent with 
hypothesis 1, the estimated coefficient for total compensation for long–term periods and cash 
compensation for short-term periods. As it is possible to observe the regressions are globally 
significant, with a 5% significance level. The following table presents the results of the 
estimation for the studied data. 
The sample includes 15109 observations for full time, the period before SFAS 123 (R) 
represented by 8103 observations and period after SFAS 123 (R) represented by 5433 
observations. The result of the SUR model is depicted for total compensation and cash 
compensation in the period between 2000 and 2010. Adjusted R2 is 0.565, which means that the 
dependent variables total compensation is explained by this set of regressors present in the 
model.  For the period after SFAS 123 (R), the adjusted R2 is 0.611, meaning that the model can 
be explained by the group of variables and is higher than that the adjustment or the model is 
better for this sample. These indicate that the variables addressed here play a significant role in 
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explaining executive compensation for short- and long-term periods, as stated by Chi-Square test 
(Probability=0). 
It is possible to note that in full period in high-tech firms CEO compensation is higher than in 
other firms of the S&P 1500 at about 31.4%, but in the period before SFAS 123(R) it was about 
44.9% higher and dropped to 15.2% in the period after SFAS 123(R). CEO compensation in 
high-technology firms is higher than in the other firms but with a smaller difference than 
previously. It is important to highlight that the implementation of the SFAS 123 (R) has an 
influence on awards in the long-term, but not for short-term periods. Stock options represent 
awards for the long–term, and the negative influence on CEO compensation in high-tech firms 
after the SFAS 123 (R) is confirmed. However, for long-term S&P 500, for the biggest S&P 
firms, CEO compensations are higher than in S&P small firms. When the annual effects are 
analyzed, it is possible to find a decrease in CEO compensation for the long-term in 2002 and 
2003 over 2000 and an increase in the period between 2007 and 2010. 
In table 3, the coefficient signs are similar in both specifications. However, the magnitudes of 
the coefficients are sensitive to the specification. As expected, earnings per share are negative 
and significantly related to total compensation for the long-term. This indicates that there are no 
explicit contractual arrangements linking compensations and earnings per share. The 
performance ratio of firms measured by return has a negative influence on CEO Compensation 
(Core, Guay, & Verrecchia, 2003a; Young & Jing, 2011). According to Aboody, Barth, and 
Kasznik (2004), there is a significant negative relation between share price and the SFAS 123 
expense when it is relevant to investors and well measured (Aboody et al., 2004). A positive and 
statistically significant relationship was found between sales, asset growth and return on assets, 
and for adding the same level of total CEO compensation and cash compensation Gabaix and 
Landier (2008) also empirically test the relation between the level of pay and firm size. Ln 
(assets), a variable proxy for firm size is positively related to pay with a coefficient total 
compensation and cash compensation in the regression.When the adjustment is performed for the 
long-term compensation, it is possible to understand that when firm sizes are compared using the 
current S&P index membership, S&P500 firms have an increase around 5.7% and for the S&P 
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Small caps 600 there is a decrease around 16.7%, comparatively to the S&P mid firms. In terms 
of cash compensation, the S&P 500 firms are 4.7% below mid cap, and the S&P small firms are 
1.6% below, comparatively to the same group of S&P mid firms. 
Another finding is that the influence on CEO pay for the short-term between the year 2006 
and 2008 does not have the same meaning in long-term compensations. As expected, there is an 
increase around 5% for each year between 2007 and 2010 as a result of the introduction of the 
SFAS 123(R). 
There is a positive relation between CEO compensation and firm performance in high-tech 
firms after the implementation of the SFAS 123 (R), but with less intensity than before. For the 
S&P 500 firms, the implementation of the SFAS 123 (R) is profitable to CEOs because it 
increases their compensations, while for high-tech CEOs it increases the value, although not as 
strongly, and it is possible to verify the normalization for all S&P 500 firms. Some authors, such 
as Hall and Murphy (2002), advocate that this adjustment of stock options is necessary to restrict 
options and to consequently increase CEO compensation. That suggests that firms find it difficult 
to downsize the executive pay packages and shift toward restricted options to provide more 
incentives for long-term CEO compensation (Carter, Lynch, & Tuna, 2007). Restricted stock 
awards are profitable for executives because the income tax consequences can be more favorable 
to employees than stock options. The special case of the USA and the consequences of a 
restricted stock mean that in some cases the award can be structured to allow for the deferral of 
all tax until the time of stock sale, and for all appreciation to be taxed at capital gain rates even if 
the stock is appreciated prior to vesting. In contrast, stock options can result in ordinary income 
to the recipient the stock has appreciated prior to vesting, with only the post-exercise appreciation 
being deferred to the time of sale at capital gain rates. Furthermore, the preferred stock usually 
carries no voting rights but may carry a dividend and may have priority over common stock in 
the payment of dividends and upon liquidation. The preferred share investor is entitled to a preset 
rate of dividend that must be paid out of earnings before any dividends are distributed to common 
shareholders.  
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6. Conclusion and future research 
 
This paper will contribute to a better understanding of the relationship between compensation 
and performance in high-technology firms, and of the behavior caused by the new role of 
expensing stock options with the SFAS 123 (R).The main purpose of this study was to examine 
whether the total compensation paid to CEOs in high-technology firms in the S&P 1500 is related 
in corporate finance and how it is influenced by the introduction of the SFAS 123 (R). 
The results presented are consistent with those achieved by Carter et al. (2007), who stated 
that the favorable accounting treatment for stock options possibly lead to overall higher CEO 
compensations. There is no evidence of a decrease in total compensation combined with the 
positive association between financial reporting. They find that after controlling standard 
economic determinants of compensation, expensing options in firms decrease compensation from 
options and increase compensation from restricted stock. These results suggest that accounting 
plays an important role in executives plan design (Carter et al., 2007). 
There was an increase in CEO compensation after the introduction of the SFAS 123 (R). 
Although the change in the plan design was not analyzed, a new accommodation of CEO 
compensation was found as a result of the new rules of the SFAS 123 (R). The influence of firm 
performance on the CEO compensation is positive and consistent in this group of high-
technology firms in the period between 2000 and 2010. 
As concluded by Graham et al. (2012), there are differences in corporate culture and in the 
managers’ latent traits, which are difficult to observe or measure. These latent traits could be an 
innate ability, personality, risk aversion or, in this case, propensity to innovation, managing 
uncertain times in order to boost (enhance) returns to the firm and reaction to stakeholders. The 
CEOs of high-tech firms had to maximize returns, facing a big competition with new 
technological solutions, thereby warranting a higher compensation than others.  
However, this work is not without limitations. This study focuses only on high-technology firms 
in the S&P 1500 in the period between 2000 and 2010, and the results of this study may not be 
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generalized to include other sectors due the specificity of high-tech firms. Another limitation  is 
the definition of high-technology used in this study that can be extended, as performed by Shim, 
Lee, and Joo (2009), to include other important item measurements, such as value of R&D 
expenditures, number of patents by firm and citation of patents (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2000; Shim 
et al., 2009). The level of R&D expenditures and new product introductions are viewed as 
proxies for innovation, risk-taking and long-term decision-making, which are crucial to 
characterize high-technology firms. Furthermore, innovation constitutes an indispensable 
component of corporate strategies.  
In the future, it will be important to analyze other developments, such as the effect of 
managerial attributes for the short- and long-term in executive compensation (Graham et al., 
2012). Furthermore, it will also be important to broaden the period of analysis in order to 
investigate the effect of the financial crisis in the USA, which started in 2007. 
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CHAPTER 42 
CEO compensation in high-tech firms: The choice between performance and 
innovation 
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1. Introduction  
 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation became common in the late 1970s and early 
1980s and has been widely discussed in the literature ever since. Numerous stories have appeared 
recently in the financial press pointing out how many executives define theirs goals in terms of 
remunerations. Given the expectation that chief executive officers play a major role in firm 
performance, a large stream of literature has been devoted to the motivational effects of CEO 
compensation relating to firm performance. Interestingly, most of these studies focus on the 
relationship between CEO pay and performance and assume that the CEO behavior will adhere to 
such alignment. Furthermore, a large set of research tools were devised to investigate the 
innovation of individual corporations, although not as a view on CEO compensation when 
managing corporate innovation. Innovation means technologies or practices that are new to a 
given society and they are not necessarily new in absolute terms. These technologies or practices 
are being disseminated in that economy or society. Innovation has always played a decisive role 
in the economic and social development of countries: it is responsible for economic growth, for 
improving productivity and welfare, and it is the foundation of competitiveness. Solid foundation 
than growth take a truly innovative evolution for economies and societies. Innovation is at the 
heart of economic development, social welfare and protection of the environment and leveraging 
innovation is particularly important today. Technological innovation is a key factor in a firm’s 
competitiveness. Technological innovation is the ultimate source of productivity and growth 
(Solow, 1988).  
Research and development (R&D) spending is a primary input for innovation, and R&D 
spending should immediately be affected by investment decisions while brand and patent are 
affected in the long-term. As reported by Percival and Mcgrath (2013), innovation is the most 
difficult aspect to measure. It is naturally assumed that innovation is not an immediate return for 
any practice upon implementation because innovation returns in the short-term are minimal.  
Why is it interesting for the CEO to manage innovation policy? Are they compensated for 
doing this? Given that innovation is a primary requisite for survival in high technology industries, 
Balkin, Markman, and Gomez-Mejia (2000) show that compensation committees in high 
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technology industries are more likely to align short-term CEO pay, specifically CEO cash pay 
with R&D spending, than compensation in low technology industries. Makri et al. (2006) report 
that CEO total pay was associated with innovation behavior in high technology firms. 
Essentially, both Balkin et al. (2000) and Makri et al. (2006) suggest that compensation is more 
likely to align CEO pay with behaviors towards R&D in high than low R&D intensive firms, and 
thus reductions in R&D in high R&D intensive firms may not lead to short-term pay increases for 
underpaid CEOs. Managers in high-tech firms are faced with different sets of performance 
expectations such as innovation, new product development, integration of technology and 
research and development management (Shim et al., 2009). 
In her work, Fong (2010) suggests that relative CEO underpayment is associated with 
reductions in R&D spending in low R&D intensive industries and with increases in R&D 
spending in high R&D intensive industries. 
Nevertheless, the research gap is also potentially serious from a policy perspective: the same 
interest may have different effects on high-tech risk taking depending on the comparative power 
of shareholders within the corporate governance structure of each firm. More surprising is the 
fact that standard agency theories suggest that ownership structure influences corporate risk 
taking (M. Jensen & Meckling, 1976; John, Litov, & Yeung, 2008) 
This paper analyzes the CEO’s choice between performance and innovation policy in high-
technologies firms when they drive the management. A different approach by Fong (2010) is 
provided as in her study she attempts to address such behavioral issues by examining the 
influence of relative CEO underpayment on reductions in R&D spending. Moreover, CEO 
behavior towards R&D spending may provide insights into CEO pay deviations and CEO 
behavioral issues given that R&D spending is directly influenced by the CEO and is related to 
both firm performance and CEO pay. 
The empirical analysis is based on three theoretical keystones. The first empirical approach 
explains the research problem of CEO compensation to address agency problems; the second 
focuses on managing corporate innovation, and  the third empirical approach is about the 
corporate risk taking in high-technology firms in order to explain CEO compensation and the link 
between performance and innovation. These theoretical keystones are combined to make three 
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testable predictions. The first prediction is about how the CEO is encouraged to promote the 
goals of maximizing the shareholder’s wealth to increase firm performance and to improve 
innovation policy. The second prediction is about how R&D as measure of innovation is related 
to CEO compensation and performance. The third prediction is about how the CEO manages risk 
taking to promote innovation. 
Surprisingly, unlike the other strands of study on the economics of innovation, this field of 
research has not benefited so far from a systematic discussion and review of its major 
contributions. This paper aims to fill this gap. 
This work is organized as follows: Section 2 contains a revision of the main theories in the 
literature, as well as an analysis on executive compensation in order to address agency problems. 
Furthermore, this section provides an analysis which examines corporate innovation and risk 
taking in terms of performance and innovation. Section 3 explains the research hypotheses and 
section 4 presents the methodology, sample and data collection to estimate regression, as well as 
the results of the econometric models to assess the influence that firm performance and 
innovation has on executive compensation. Lastly, the main conclusions are discussed, as well as 
some limitations and new perspectives for future research. 
 
 
2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
 
2.1 Executive compensations to address agency problems 
The general acceptance of the agency theory and the parallel research on executive 
compensation began in the early 1980s. It was the evolution of the modern corporation with 
ownership separation and control that undermined the agency theory. Early studies in this area 
focused on documenting the relation between CEO pay and firm performance. The discussion of 
executive compensation must proceed with the fundamental agency problem afflicting 
management decision-making as background. 
The shareholders’ primacy view of the firm, built on the principal–agent paradigm, states that 
shareholders (the principals) engage managers (the agents) to run the firm on the shareholders’ 
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behalf (M. Jensen & Meckling, 1976). According to Jensen and Murphy (1990), there are two 
approaches to agency problems. The authors state that there is an optimal contracting approach, 
which is when boards use design compensation schemes to maximize shareholder value with 
efficient incentives (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). To connect the agency problem and the 
executive compensation, the authors use the managerial power approach when this connection is 
seen as an integral part of the agency problems. It is important to remember that the principal-
agent problems treat the difficulties that arise under conditions where information is incomplete 
and asymmetric whenever a principal hires an agent (Eisenhardt (1989); Lucian Arye Bebchuk 
and Fried (2003); K. J. Murphy (1999)). The first is the desire or goal of the principal and agent 
conflict and it is difficult or expensive for the principal to verify what the agent is actually doing. 
The problem is that the principal is unable to check if the agent has behaved correctly. Secondly, 
there is the problem of risk sharing facing the different attitudes toward risk, because the 
principal and the agent have different actions according to different risk preferences (Eisenhardt, 
1989). 
Brian J. Hall and Liebman (1998) argue that the solution to the agency problem is aligning 
the incentives of executives with the interests of shareholders by granting (or selling) stock and 
stock options to the CEOs. The CEOs have the correct incentives on every margin, including 
effort, perquisites and project choice, and support that the optimal contract is a one-to-one 
correspondence between firm value and CEO pay (Brian J. Hall & Liebman, 1998). It is 
reasonable for small firms but it is not appropriate for large firms because optimal contracts 
represent a trade-off between incentives and risk-sharing (Eisenhardt, 1989). In their work, 
(Brian J. Hall & Liebman, 1998) conclude that the relationship between pay and performance is 
much larger than has previously been recognized, and that this includes both gains and losses in 
CEO wealth. The salary and bonus vary so little because corporate board members are often 
reluctant to reduce CEO pay, even in response to poor performance and that may attract 
unwanted media attention. Using salary and bonuses to reward and penalize CEOs may only be 
possible to create high-powered incentives that align CEO pay with shareholder objectives (Brian 
J. Hall and Liebman (1998)). A large part of the executive pay literature argues that 
compensation and managerial interests should be aligned with shareholder interests in order to 
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solve agency problems (see, for example, the surveys by ((Core et al., 2003) and by (K. J. 
Murphy, 1999)). Managers in high-technology firms have different goals, such as managing 
intangible assets, continuous improvement, and software and product development. As a result, 
they must continuously innovate and sustain growth in an increasingly competitive and global 
market (Shim et al., 2009). 
Studies that link corporate governance to innovation form a corpus of research that is difficult 
to disentangle for two interrelated reasons. Firstly, a well-received theory of the innovative 
enterprise is still missing, which implies the absence of a single coherent conceptual framework 
for understanding the phenomenon of corporate technological innovation at firm level. Secondly, 
because such a theory is lacking, contributions to this issue have remained separate and relate to 
various and different aspects of corporate governance. 
As previously discussed, existing theories to provide predictions on the outlined 
considerations related to CEO compensation, allowing for the hypotheses formulated, support 
and enhance this evidence: 
H1: CEO compensation is determinant and negatively correlated with firm performance in high-
technology firms. 
2.2 Corporate innovation 
This section briefly discusses how the most influential corporate innovation deals with 
technological innovation, in order to outline the theoretical ground on which the debate on this 
issue develops. The traditional economics of innovation treats firms as if they were similar and 
considers innovation as a direct consequence of profit-maximizing behavior (Nelson, 1991). 
Conversely, the literature on corporate governance and innovation recognizes that firms differ in 
their internal governments’ structure and organization, and recognizes that differences are very 
important for a firm’s economic performance. By definition ‘innovation’ means technologies or 
practices that are new to a given society and they are not necessarily new in absolute terms. 
These technologies or practices are being disseminated in that economy or society. Innovation 
has always played a decisive role in the economic and social development of countries: it is 
responsible for economic growth, for improving productivity and welfare, and it is the foundation 
83 
 
of competitiveness. As Belloc (2012) reports, technological innovation is the development of an 
original product or process, through the utilization of productive resources and the embodiment, 
combination or synthesis of knowledge in a new object or method. The author argues that 
innovation is generated through a collective and cumulative process of learning as R&D 
programs, which requires the commitment of resources for a prolonged period of time. He 
defines that technological innovation involves three elements: specificity of the investments, 
uncertainty about the result and impossibility of anticipating future returns. In most firms, if 
somewhere deep in the corporate hierarchy an innovator has a very daring and promising 
innovation idea, the traditional advice is to first obtain top management commitment in order to 
overcome the resistance that is to be expected later on during the innovation project. This is this 
the traditional approach; however, there are several issues associated: often there is only one 
chance to pitch an idea at the top management. If the idea is not convincing enough, not only are 
the executives going to say "no", they are probably going to remain negative indefinitely, due to 
anchoring bias and confirmation bias. Another issue associated is the political power played, 
when people are forced to follow extensive corporate procedures, distortion by certain 
stakeholders with differing procedures and pressure for short-term results. 
A major difficulty in observing the effect of innovation on growth is that a firm may require a 
long period of time to convert economically valuable knowledge increases into economic 
performance (Coad, 2007). Leveraging innovation is particularly important today, in what is the 
most severe global economic crisis. History has shown that times of crisis are also times of 
innovation, when institutional, mental, and other obstacles are more easily removed. The time is 
thus ripe for mobilizing creativity and entrepreneurship to meet the challenges ahead. 
Government and other leaders play a key role in promoting innovation in public goods and in 
finding ways to conduct business more effectively. Most importantly, the government should 
help provide the right environment for innovation.  
Dealing with innovation variables in econometric estimation can be problematic. The first 
problem involves measuring innovation. Generally, two indicators are used to measure 
innovative activity: an input measurement, R&D spending (Lanjouw & Schankerman, 2004), and 
an output measurement, the number of patents and brands. According to Belloc (2013), both of 
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these indicators have some disadvantages. R&D spending is an imperfect proxy for innovative 
activity, because not all innovations are generated within formal R&D programs and the net book 
value of brands, patents and trademarks does not capture all innovations. In our estimation, the 
aggregated number of net book value of brands, patents and trademarks awarded by the firms and 
R&D spending in high-tech are used as indexes of innovative performance. The second problem 
is the time around innovation programs. While R&D spending should be immediately affected by 
investment decisions, innovation programs take time to get to a patent, or the brand is awarded 
within one year after an investment decision and, on average, the duration of innovation projects 
is between five and 10 years. The finance for innovation usually comes from internal sources as 
cash flow, but when substantial investment is required, external investment may be necessary. 
Reductions in R&D spending merits considerable attention because R&D spending is a primary 
input into innovation (Heeley, Matusik, & Jain, 2007) and thus a firm’s competitive advantage 
(Makri et al., 2006). 
As discussed in previous theories, providing predictions on the outlined considerations related 
to corporate innovation makes it possible to select a second hypothesis. 
H2: R&D is determinant and positively correlated with firm performance and CEO compensation 
in high-technology firms. 
 
2.3 Risk taking to performance and innovation 
Agency research recognizes that the interests of CEOs and shareholders diverge with regard 
to firm risk, with CEOs preferring  less firm risk and shareholders preferring more firm risk (Tosi 
& Gomez-Mejia, 1989). These differences occur because CEOs are less diversified than 
shareholders and both the CEO’s pay and employment are tied to the firm. Therefore, CEOs 
prefer short-term outcomes that have inherently less risk than long-term outcomes. Furthermore, 
Hill and Snell (1988) argue that institutional investors are risk-averse and so when they are major 
stockholders they also wield pressure on management to obtain good short-term performance to 
the detriment of long-term projects and innovation. Only one party has both the right to make 
residual management decisions and the right to claim the residual profits of the production, and 
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the remaining parties lose the ability to make opportunistic threats. The firm as a centralized 
structure of governance is only a second-best solution to the extent that under a one-party-owner 
regime, the non-owner firm members lose the ability to hold up, as well as the incentive to invest. 
This deeply affects innovation activities because innovation is a process of collective and specific 
investment (Belloc, 2012). 
The innovation literature reports high failure rates for innovation, ranging from 50% to 90% 
as reported by Spieth and Hedenreich (2013). They show that individuals will be less likely to 
adopt new technological products if they perceive a significant risk associated with such 
exploration. Offering warranties may also be effective in reducing perceived risk associated with 
innovations independent from the possibility of a new product trial or demonstration. Moreover, 
the problem is innovations that fail cannot generate future revenues and, therefore, they can 
hinder the competitiveness of companies in the long run. 
Although innovation, and thus R&D expenses, is important for creating firm value and a 
sustainable competitive advantage, research shows that CEOs will opportunistically target R&D 
spending because R&D projects are associated with information asymmetry and risk (Aboody & 
Lev, 2000). Innovation is an inherent risk and reductions in R&D can quickly increase a firm’s 
short-term market performance at the expense of innovation and long-term returns. R&D 
investments also inherently involve information asymmetry between principals and agents, even 
in high technology firms. Aboody and Lev (2000) and M. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest 
that CEOs should possess the highest knowledge about the firm, which implies that CEOs should 
have a better understanding than owners about the optimal level of R&D spending, thus allowing 
for more informed, opportunistic action by the CEO. This information asymmetry allows CEOs 
to make opportunistic reductions in R&D spending, which Joseph P. O'Connor, Jr., Joseph E. 
Coombs, and Gilley (2006) believe is problematic because decisions that benefit short-term 
performance often do not lead to long-term benefits for shareholders. These consequences make 
reductions in R&D spending relevant because shareholders generally find R&D spending 
desirable due to their interests in greater risk-taking than CEOs and their interests in long-term 
firm performance. 
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Another important argument is the US generally-accepted accounting practice (GAAP) that 
requires the immediate expensing of R&D spending, and thus a reduction in R&D spending 
increases short-term performance through increases in current market and accounting 
performance. Sometimes R&D spending has been found to be negatively associated with CEO 
pay. In fact, research on R&D spending shows that when a CEO approaches retirement or when 
the firm faces a potential reduction in firm performance CEOs tend to reduce R&D spending and 
suggest that compensation committees respond to, and effectively mitigate, potential 
opportunistic reductions in R&D spending (Cheng, 2004). CEOs approaching retirement no 
longer financially gain from the long-term benefits associated with current R&D spending; 
instead, they financially gain when R&D is reduced due to the immediate expensing of R&D 
based on generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) requirements. Moreover, if firm 
performance decreases, the CEO could face termination, which again reduces the CEO’s 
opportunity to gain from current R&D spending. Given the strategic importance of R&D 
spending on long-term firm performance, Cheng (2004) shows that compensation committees 
will adjust CEO compensation contracts to reduce opportunistic manipulations of R&D spending 
when the firm encounters the horizon problem or the myopia problem, conditions under which 
R&D manipulation is likely to occur. However, the arguments provided by the agency theory 
suggest that CEOs may be encouraged to behave opportunistically towards R&D spending 
outside the specific conditions presented by the horizon and myopia problems, which may be 
when the CEO pay deviates from the labor market rate. 
As previously discussed, existing theories provide predictions on the outlined considerations 
related to risk taking, allowing for the hypotheses presented below. 
H3: Risk taking positively influences firm performance and innovation in high-technology firms. 
In summary, it was found that firms are subjected to the agency problem in which the CEO 
may not work in favor of the shareholders to maximize their wealth by improving firm 
performance and innovation. The risk taking to make decisions and theirs goals are important 
factors. Furthermore, the decisions related to CEO compensation are based on the firms’ 
accounting performance and innovation in high-technologies firms. 
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3. Sample, Data and Method of Analysis 
 
The ExecuComp and the DataStream databases were used to find finance performance and 
innovation variables and to create a sample of firms between 2000 and 2010. The ExecuComp 
database covers current, historic and total compensation data such as salary, bonus, stock options 
and restricted stock grants, as well as managerial stock and option holdings on top five executives 
of more than 2600 firms in the Standard & Poor’s Index in the United States. The total sample 
collected was 5,500 observations for the five hundred companies of the S&P 500 for the eleven 
years. The DataStream provides access to a large variety of financial and economic data, such as 
financial statements, accounting ratios, price information of listed companies in the world; 
exchange rates, interest rates and thousands of economic time series from various countries in the 
world. The match between these two databases was made by comparing the same variables for 
each firm and year in order to confirm the values to the same firm. If the firm short name, 
number of employees and the asset value was equal in the two database, it is guaranteed that the 
firm is the same. 
To test this hypothesis, the following specification is run on the balanced panel of high-
technology firms. High-Technology firms are the firms that operate in an industry with a four-
digit SIC code of 3570, 3571, 3572, 3576, 3577, 3661, 3674, 4812, 4813, 5045, 5961, 7370, 
7371, 7372, or 7373, DHTECH variables using the Fama and French classification of 48 industry 
groups, instead of the four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code (Fama & French, 
1997). A new DHTEC economy dummy is also included to control for the possibility that 
opportunistic timing was more prevalent among new economy (hi-tech) firms (definition of the 
new economy follows Murphy (2003)). 
Another classification about high-technology firms is the OECD's classification (stable since 
1973), of R&D intensity, which is presented next. The definition of R&D intensity is the ratio of 
expenditures by a firm on research and development to the firm's sales. This classification defines 
high-technology firms when the value of R&D intensity is greater than 7%. The absolute levels 
of R&D expenditures indicate the level of effort dedicated to producing future products and 
process improvements while maintaining current market share and increasing operating 
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efficiency. By extension, such expenditures may reflect the firms' perceptions on market demand 
for new and improved technology. However, R&D intensity is the most frequently used 
measurement "to gauge the relative importance of R&D across industries and among firms in the 
same industry”. William N. Leonard, Economics professor since 1971, found that research 
intensity is measured usually by ratios of scientific personnel to total employment or by R&D 
expenditures/sales, and gains in variables such as productivity, profits, sales, assets, and other 
variables  (Leonard, 1971). 
3.1 Dependent variables 
The dependent variables used for the tests are CEO compensation as the total year pay for the 
top executives, return on asset to measure performance (G. B. Murphy, Trailer, & Hill, 1996) and 
the R&D expenses to measure innovation (Lanjouw & Schankerman, 2004) for each firm in the 
S&P 500 for the period between 2000 and 2010, as defined in table 4. Total compensation the 
sum of the compensations of top executives includes: salary, bonus, non-equity incentive plan 
compensation, grant-date fair value of option awards, grant-date fair value of stock awards, 
deferred compensation earnings reported as compensation, and other compensations. The return 
on assets in calculated for each firm and per year as the net income before extraordinary items 
and discontinued operations divided by total assets. Research and development expenses 
represent all direct and indirect costs related to the creation and development of new processes, 
techniques, applications and products with commercial possibilities. 
3.2 Independent variables 
The key independent variables are firm level factors reports by each firm, presented in table 4 
in the appendix. A set of variables explain corporate finance as common equity that represents 
common shareholders' investment in a company, the number of employees give a perception of 
company sizes and the A return index shows a theoretical growth in value of a shareholding over 
a specified period, assuming that dividends are re-invested to purchase additional units of an 
equity or unit trust at the closing price applicable on the ex-dividend date. Market capitalization 
represents the total market value of the company based on year end price and number of shares 
89 
 
converted to U.S. dollars using the year end exchange rate, and for companies with more than 
one type of common/ordinary share, market capitalization represents the total market value of the 
company. Another set of variables to explain corporate innovation are patents/sales as total 
amount of patents owned in the current year for each firm divided by net sales or revenue in US 
dollars. The R&S/sales five-year average is the arithmetic average of the last five years of 
research and development by sales. Brands and patent net represent the net book value of brands, 
patents and trademarks. Cash-flow represents the net cash receipts and disbursements resulting 
from the operations of the company, fundamental to make investments. The tool to measure risky 
corporate policies is R&D expenses over total assets for each year, which is commonly employed 
(Bargeron, Lehn, and Zutter (2010) and Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006)). 
3.3 Method of analysis  
The archived sample has led to do the analysis of the panel partly because panel data provide 
such a rich environment for the development of estimation techniques and theoretical results. In 
more practical terms, however, researchers have been able to use time-series cross-sectional data 
to examine issues that could not be studied in either cross-sectional or time-series settings alone. 
The fundamental advantage of a panel data set over a cross section is that it will allow the 
researcher great flexibility in modeling differences in behavior across individuals. The panel data 
model is used because it is the most suitable way of studying a large set of repeated observations, 
and due to the fact that it assesses evolution over time, consisting of cross-section observations 
from different points in time. With panel data it is possible to simultaneously explore several 
variations over time and between different individuals. The use of such models has increased 
immensely and, in fact, combining time and cross-sectional data brings many advantages: it is 
possible to use a larger number of observations and the degree of freedom in estimates increases, 
thus making statistical inferences more credible. At the same time, the risk of multicollinearity is 
reduced since the data in companies present different structures. Moreover, this model provides 
access to further information and the efficiency and stability of the estimators increase, while 
enabling the introduction of dynamic adjustments (Gujarati (2004) and William (2003)). This 
study starts by using the Generalized Linear Square (GLS) to estimate the model, and then the 
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Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) is used in order to solve interdependence problems. For 
this kind of data on the observable variables, the GMM finds values for the model parameters 
such that the corresponding sample moment conditions are met as closely as possible (Hansen, 
1982). 
The first stage was estimating three equations using the EGLS fixed effects method to explain 
the research questions. Fixed effects model improves the estimation consistency. The models 
introduced by each equation presented below were used to test relevant variables and to explain 
executive compensation, return on assets and R&D, respectively. The model specification: 
 
CEO_compij=b11+b12*ROAij+b13*R&Dij+b14*CEquityij+b15*Cash_Flowij+b16*EMPLij+b17*RIij+ 
b18*MC ij +b19*R&D/S5ij + b10*DHTECHij+ uij 
 
 
(A) 
ROAij=b21+b22*CEO_compij+b23*R&Dij+b24*NIBEXij+b25*Cash_Flowij+b26*SalesGrij+b27*R&D/Sij
+ b28*R&D/Aij ij +b29*RIij + b30*DHTECHij+ vij 
 
 
(B) 
R&Dij=b31+b32*CEO_compij+b33*ROAij+b34*CEquityij+b35*Cash_Flowij+b36*R&D/Aij+b37*AssetsG
rij+ b38* ROA(-1)ij+b39*ROA(-2)ij + b40*Patent/salesij+ b41*BrandPatentij+ zij 
 
(C) 
 
Where, i and j represent the year and the company, respectively. The coefficients b11, b21 and 
b31 are constants denoting the base level from which the sum of the compensations of top 
executive, return on assets and R&D, respectively, varies according to the changes in explanatory 
variables. 
In the second stage, the same set of equations was estimated using the GMM method in order 
to verify consistency. A brief review of the inter-relationship between CEO compensation, 
performance and innovation suggests that, from an econometric point of view, to study the 
relationship between corporate governance and performance it is necessary to formulate the three 
equations that specify the relationship between the abovementioned variables. The following 
system of three simultaneous equations is specified: 
 
CEO compensation = ƒ1 (Performance, Innovation Z1, E1) (1) 
Performance = ƒ2 (CEO Compensation, Innovation, Risk-taking, Z2, E2) (2) 
Innovation = ƒ3 (CEO Compensation, Performance, Risk-taking, Z3, E3) (3) 
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Where the Zi are vectors of control variables and instruments influencing the dependent 
variables and the Ei are the error terms associated with exogenous noise and the unobservable 
features of managerial behavior or risk taking that explain cross-sectorial variation in CEO 
compensation, performance and innovation. The estimation issues for the equation above are 
discussed in the next section. 
4. Results  
This section presents the descriptive statistics of variables and estimation results of equation 
specifications. The descriptive statistics of the variables for total CEO compensation for high-
tech firms are presented in Table 1. In the S&P500, in the period between 2000 and 2010, there 
are about 11.2 % high-technology firms, and it is possible to observe that the group of top 
executives in each company has an average total compensation around USD 26,036 million. 
Other interesting finding is that, in this period and in this group of companies, R&D/Assets and 
the return on assets are around 3.74% and 5.35%, respectively. The number observations of 
patent/sales, brand and patent and R&D expenses are the lowest value reported by firms, 
demonstrating the difficulty of measuring financial accounting variables of corporate innovation. 
 
Table 1 - Descriptive statistics of variables  
Variable Mean Median Max Min St.dev. N 
CEO_Comp 26036.93 18611.410 641446.2 206.394 28966.87 4730 
ROA 5.351553 5.226 5.03E+01 -577.85 14.83626 4760 
R&D 479792.8 94926 9379000 0.0 1121480 3033 
Common Equity 7790622 3143000 2.11E+08 17311000 15668956 5261 
Cash-Flow 1940758 769047.5 1.30E+08 -1.11E+08 6092504 5188 
Employees 43130.53 15800 2100000 11 101901.5 5149 
Return Index 13950.27 2211.17 4.87E+06 1.19 150097.8 4970 
Market Capitalization 21975406 8961464 5.04E+08 2868 41403246 5096 
R&D/Sales -5yr avg 51.81334 2.605 1.8E+04 0 7.69E+02 2644 
DHTECH 0.112 0 1 0 0.315395 5500 
NIBEX 1089.882 444.666 45220 -99289 3399.444 4760 
Sales growth 12.51071 8.028 2152.032 -92.688 46.17325 4752 
R&D/Sales 10.90584 2.18 8589.1 0 186.5726 3033 
R&D/Assets 3.741279 1.89936 4.19E+01 0 4.95E+00 2969 
Assets 43365.55 10109.3 2264909 91.581 151774.7 4760 
Patents/Sales 507.6204 233 21458 0 1143.943 614 
Brands patent net 785720.1 104215 40660000 0 2919333 1346 
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Table 2 reports the estimation results of the basic panel model specifications. The three equation 
parameters report the estimation results of the estimated generalized least square (EGLS) method 
one after the other. While the left column reports the variables, the remaining columns report the 
estimated parameters of the various model specifications. Equations (A), (B) and (C) are panel 
model specifications for CEO compensation, performance and innovation, respectively, and are 
consistent with the hypotheses presented in this study. 
 
Table 2 - Estimation results of the Panel EGLS method Table 2 - Estimation results of the Pane 1 
Method: Panel EGLS Period Fixed effects 
 
(A) (B) (C) 
Sample 2000 2010 
 
(ad): 2001 2010  (ad): 2004 2010 
Cross-sections incl.:  268 
 
279 
 
69 
 Total panel observations 2377 
 
2416 
 
285 
 Dependent Variables CEO_Comp ROA R&D 
Variables Coefficient Prob.   Coefficient Prob.   Coefficient Prob.   
C 18817.96 0.0000 5.57452 0.0000 -1026359 0.0000 
CEO_Comp 
  
-1.15E-05 0.1974 8.498181 0.0327 
ROA -141.6971 0.0002 
  
20992.79 0.1273 
R&D 0.001784 0.0000 4.17E-07 0.0067 
  Common Equity 0.000464 0.0000 
  
0.028445 0.0039 
Cash-Flow -0.00072 0.0001 -9.47E-07 0.0000 0.057398 0.0729 
Employees 13.82775 0.0000 
    Return Index 0.028673 0.1597 3.98E-05 0.0000 
  Market Capitalization 8.39E-05 0.0000 
    R&D/Sales -5yr avg 1.393987 0.0009 
    Sales growth 150.2027 0.0000 0.045875 0.0000 
  DHTECH 2156.27 0.0314 0.510833 0.2927 
  NIBEX 
  
0.001793 0.0000 
  R&D/Sales 
  
-0.430558 0.0000 
  R&D/Assets 
  
0.547473 0.0000 135765.2 0.0000 
Assets growth 
    
-7586.161 0.0219 
ROA(-1) 
    
24499.8 0.0842 
ROA(-2) 
    
29560.22 0.0221 
Patents/Sales 
    
555.0819 0.0000 
Brands patent net 
    
0.048499 0.0166 
 
Weighted Statistics 
R-squared 0.28672 
 
0.21393 
 
0.570793 
 Adjusted R-squared 0.280668 
 
0.208027 
 
0.545169 
 S.E. of regression 25556.92 
 
14.54861 
 
1455580 
 F-statistic 47.35314 
 
36.24148 
 
22.27549 
 Prob(F-statistic) 0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
Unweighted Statistics 
R-squared 0.244415   0,189227   0.552584   
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The statistics are computed based on a panel data set of 500 firm-year observations, a total of 
about 2377 observations when testing CEO compensation, 2416 observations for return on assets 
and 285 observations for R&D expenses.  
Equation (A) tests CEO compensation.The hypothesis for the negative influence of CEO 
compensation on firm performance and the positive influence of CEO compensation on the 
innovation is presented in Table 2. As it is possible to observe, the regressions are globally 
significant, with a 5% significance level. The following table presents the results of the 
estimation for the studied data. The performance ratio of firms measured by return on assets and 
cash-flow have a negative influence on CEO Compensation ((Core et al., 2003) and (Young & 
Jing, 2011)). Gabaix and Landier (2008) also empirically test the relation between the level of 
pay and firm size. A positive and statistically significant relationship was found between R&D 
expenses, R&D/sales, common equity, market capitalization and employees for the same level of 
total CEO compensation. Equation (C) tests corporate innovation and R&D expense variables 
were used for measuring. All independent variables are statistically significant, with a 5% and 
10% significance level. It is important highlight a positive and statistically significant relation 
between CEO compensation, return on assets for the year, previous year and second previous 
year and R&D expenses. In equations (B) and (C), it is possible to find the answers of the third 
hypothesis where the variables R&D/Assets, which are used as proxy for risk-taking in long-term 
corporate investments, have a significant and positive influence on performance and innovation.   
Well suited econometric techniques should be used in empirical research, when corporate 
governance variables are placed in relation to innovation performance indicators. Some 
endogeneity problems are likely to occur in empirical corporate governance studies, because of 
the interrelation between the various dimensions of corporate governance and because of a nexus 
of reverse causality that might flow from a corporation’s innovation to its governance structure. 
Single-equation linear regressions, largely used in the existing literature, may lead to incomplete 
or misleading results (Belloc, 2013), and for that reason another method was tested here to avoid 
this problem.  
For the second stage of the study, in order to test the three research questions, the estimation 
results of the basic panel GMM model specifications (table 3) are reported. While the column on 
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the left reports the variables, the remaining columns report the estimated parameters of each 
equation (1), (2) and (3). It is possible to confirm that there is a positive and statistically 
significant relationship between CEO compensation and R&D expenses with regard to the H1 
research question. Cash flow has a negative and statistically significant relationship with CEO 
compensation and return on assets (1), but that relation is positive and statistically significant 
with R&D. Assets growth has a negative and statistically significant relationship with R&D (3). 
Also regarding equation (3) and answers to the H2 research questions, it was possible to confirm 
that there is a positively and significantly relation between CEO_Comp and Performance and 
R&D expenses. Consistent with the H3 research question, R&D/assets positively influence 
performance and R&D expenses, as observed in equations (2) and (3). 
 
Table 3 - Estimation results of the basic panel GMM model specifications  
Method: Panel GMM 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Sample 2000 2010 
 
(ad): 2001 2010  (ad): 2004 2010 
Cross-sections incl.:  268 
 
279 
 
69 
 Total panel observations 2377 
 
2416 
 
285 
 2SLS instrument weighting matrix 
      
Dependent Variables CEO_Comp ROA R&D 
Variables Coefficient Prob.   Coefficient Prob.   Coefficient Prob.   
C 18340.91 0.0000 7.427593 0.0000 -899199.8 0.0001 
CEO_Comp 
  
-4.12E-05 0.0067 8.377301 0.0332 
ROA -255.0328 0.0000 
  
21372.52 0.1067 
R&D 0.001929 0.0006 1.29E-06 0.0002 
  Common Equity 0.000728 0.0000 
  
0.023661 0.0170 
Cash-Flow -0.001661 0.0000 -1.89E-06 0.0000 0.060841 0.0547 
Employees 10.95048 0.0197 
    Return Index 0.079935 0.0063 4.09E-05 0.0163 
  Market Capitalization 1.42E-04 0.0000 
    R&D/Sales -5yr avg 1.114226 0.1015 
    Sales growth 267.4261 0.0000 0.023007 0.0939 
  DHTECH 4998.71 0.0008 1.938346 0.0732 
  NIBEX 
  
0.003596 0.0000 
  R&D/Sales 
  
-0.867757 0.0000 
  R&D/Assets 
  
0.743603 0.0000 127029.9 0.0000 
Assets growth 
    
-7252.783 0.0246 
ROA(-1) 
    
24017.35 0.0850 
ROA(-2) 
    
25607.66 0.0455 
Patents/Sales 
    
585.5587 0.0000 
Brands patent net 
    
0.053496 0.0063 
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R-squared 0.25519 
 
0.243557 
 
0.548564 
 Adjusted R-squared 0.252042 
 
0.240728 
 
0.532088 
 S.E. of regression 26663.55 
 
16.08757 
 
1451614 
 Durbin-Watson stast. 1.027593 
 
0.753336 
 
0.170919 
 Instruments 11   10   11   
 
A consistent result was found when testing three equations using the EGLS (table 2) and the 
GMM method (table 3). In this second set of tests, almost all explanatory variables statistically 
show that there is a significant relationship between CEO compensation, returns on assets and 
R&D. Only a DHTECH dummy variable was not statistically significant to explain return on 
assets. A negative relation between CEO compensation and return on assets and cash flow was 
found, although there is a positive relation with R&D as expected. When the three equations and 
the interdependency of their independent variables are observed together, it is possible to suggest 
that in terms of their compensation CEOs can choose between innovation and performance, 
influenced by risk-taking in long-term corporate investment. 
Carpenter and Petersen (2002) have studied an unbalanced panel of about 2400 publicly traded 
US firms in the period between 1981 and 1998, and in their work they show that equity financing 
has a positive effect on firm investments in high-tech companies. Another finding is that return 
on assets for the previous year and previous two years, together with patent/sales and brand plus 
patent value, have an influence on R&D. Gomez-Mejia et al. (2000) have shown that CEO 
compensation was related to innovation as measured by the number of patents and R&D 
spending. Their findings are very interesting and show an important change in CEO 
compensation, which in the past has been heavily tied to accounting and stock performance 
measurements. Their study reports an important change and a new trend in managerial 
compensation that relies more on process (innovation) rather than on financial results, such as 
accounting and market performance measurements. Moreover, consistent with prior research that 
suggests that compensation in high technology industries is more likely to align CEO pay with 
R&D spending than compensation in low technology industries (Makri et al., 2006), the results 
show that such opportunistic reductions conditioned on underpayments are mitigated in high 
R&D intensive industries.  
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Table 5 (appendix) presents Pearson´s correlations (all coefficients in bold are statistically 
significant at 0.05 level). Employees and net Income before extraordinary items and discontinued 
operation are statistically significant and the positive correlation with CEO compensation, return 
of assets and R&D variables is high, and statistically significant but with relatively low 
correlations with dummy variables of high-technologies. Sales growth, brand, patent net have 
statistically significant low correlations with CEO compensation, return on assets and R&D.  
 
5. Conclusion and future research 
 
The main purpose of this study was to examine whether the total compensation paid to CEOs 
in high-technology firms in the S&P 500 is related to corporate innovation and performance. This 
work aims at contributing to explain the influence that innovation technologies and performance 
has on CEO compensation in these companies. In conclusion, according to the results that were 
obtained there is empirical evidence to state that in high-technology firms in the S&P500, during 
the period between 2000 and 2010,  innovation determined total CEO compensation. Results 
suggest that in high-tech firms innovation determines CEO compensation and CEOs tend to use 
more sophisticated performance measurements. The findings indicate that CEO compensation in 
high-tech firms chooses innovation over performance, and that there is a strong and positive 
relation between CEO compensation and innovation. This econometric study provides a better 
understanding of the CEO risk taking and the relationship between CEO compensation, 
innovation and performance in high-technology firms. 
In the future, to enhance this study it is necessary to analyze the short- and long-term period 
of CEO compensation to understand their goal throughout the duration of R&D projects, brands 
and patent processes. This study only focuses on high-technology firms in the S&P 500 in the 
period between 2000 and 2010, but an extended set of observations with different sectors or 
industries was important to confirm our conclusion. Another aspect would be understanding the 
influence that the 2007 crisis had in this period. 
Organizing such a body of literature was difficult because studies on this issue form a 
heterogeneous puzzle that covers interrelated aspects of corporate organization. This study started 
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by briefly discussing how different approaches to the analysis of the firm deal with technological 
innovation, in order to outline the theoretical ground on which the various studies linking 
innovation to corporate governance are developed. This paper describes the main corporate risk 
taking through which a system of corporate governance shapes innovation activities, classifying 
them in the three dimensions of the agency problem, corporate innovation and risk taking. 
Finally, the literature on high-technology firms has been examined, and the relationship between 
the CEO behavior of corporate governance and aggregate innovation activity of corporations has 
been discussed.  
As reported by Belloc (2012), the more recent and rather heterogeneous literature recognizes 
the importance of corporate governance for a firm’s performance. The author states that 
differences in the various dimensions of a corporation’s governance are important for its 
innovation activity. Contrasting with this opinion, it was found that in fact innovation in high-
technology firms appears as a result of technological determinism in a context of profit-
maximizing firms, and it can emerge because individuals decide to invest in innovative projects, 
where these investment decisions are shaped by the corporate governance system and by CEO 
decision. 
 
 
6. References 
 
Aboody, D., & Lev, B. (2000). Information Asymmetry, R&D, and Insider Gains. The Journal of 
Finance, 55(6), 2747-2766. doi: 10.1111/0022-1082.00305 
Balkin, D. B., Markman, G. D., & Gomez-Mejia, L. R. (2000). Is CEO Pay in High-Technology 
Firms Related to Innovation? The Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 43 (No. 6), 
1118-1129.  
Bargeron, L. L., Lehn, K. M., & Zutter, C. J. (2010). Sarbanes-Oxley and corporate risk-taking. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 49(1–2), 34-52. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2009.05.001 
98 
 
Bebchuk, L. A., & Fried, J. M. (2003). Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem. Journal 
of Economic Perspectives, 17((3,Summer), 71-92.).  
Belloc, F. (2012). Corporate Governance and Innovation: A Survey. Journal of Economic 
Surveys, 26(5), 835-864. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-6419.2011.00681.x 
Belloc, F. (2013). Law, finance and innovation: the dark side of shareholder protection. 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, 37(4), 863-888. doi: 10.1093/cje/bes068 
Carpenter, R. E., & Petersen, B. C. (2002). Capital Market Imperfections, high-tech investiment, 
and new equity financing. The Economic Journal, 112(477), F54-F72. doi: 10.1111/1468-
0297.00683 
Cheng, S. (2004). R&D Expenditures and CEO Compensation. The Accounting Review, 79(2), 
305-328. doi: 10.2308/accr.2004.79.2.305 
Coad, A. (2007). Firm Growth: A Survey. Papers on Economics and Evolution.  
Coles, J. L., Daniel, N. D., & Naveen, L. (2006). Managerial incentives and risk-taking. Journal 
of Financial Economics, 79(2), 431-468. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.09.004 
Core, J. E., Guay, W. R., & Larcker, D. F. (2003). Executive Equity Compensation and 
Incentives: A Survey. Economic Policy Review, Vol. 9, No. 1, April 2003.  
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review. The Academy of 
Management Review, 14(1), 57-74.  
Fama, E. F., & French, K. R. (1997). Industry costs of equity. Journal of Financial Economics, 
43(2), 153-193. doi: 10.1016/s0304-405x(96)00896-3 
Fong, E. A. (2010). Relative CEO Underpayment and CEO Behaviour Towards R&D Spending. 
Journal of Management Studies, 47(6), 1095-1122. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-
6486.2009.00861.x 
99 
 
Gabaix, X., & Landier, A. (2008). Why has CEO Pay Increased So Much? The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 123(1), 49-100. doi: 10.1162/qjec.2008.123.1.49 
Gomez-Mejia, L. R., Gideon, D. M., & Balkin, D. B. (2000). Is CEO Pay in High-Technology 
Firms Related to Innovation? The Academy of Management Journal, 43(6), 1118-1129.  
Gujarati, D. N. (2004). Basic Econometrics (Vol. Fourth Edition). 
Hall, B. J., & Liebman, J. B. (1998). Are CEOS Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?*. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 113(3), 653-691. doi: doi:10.1162/003355398555702 
Hansen, L., Peter. (1982). Large sample properties of generalized method of moments estimators. 
Econometrica, 50, 1029--1054.  
Heeley, M. B., Matusik, S. F., & Jain, N. (2007). Innovation, Appropriability, And The 
Underpricing Of Initial Public Offerings. Academy of Management Journal, 50(1), 209-
225. doi: 10.5465/amj.2007.24162388 
Hill, C. W. L., & Snell, S. A. (1988). External control, corporate strategy, and firm performance 
in research-intensive industries. Strategic Management Journal, 9(6), 577-590. doi: 
10.1002/smj.4250090605 
Jensen, M., & Meckling, W. (1976). Theory of the firm: managerial behaviour, agency costs, and 
ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics(3), 308-360.  
John, K., Litov, L., & Yeung, B. (2008). Corporate Governance and Risk-Taking. The Journal of 
Finance, 63(4), 1679-1728. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01372.x 
Joseph P. O'Connor, Jr., R. L. P., Joseph E. Coombs, & Gilley, K. M. (2006). Do CEO Stock 
Options Prevent or Promote Fraudulent Financial Reporting? ACAD MANAGE J, 49(3), 
483-500.  
100 
 
Lanjouw, J. O., & Schankerman, M. (2004). Patent Quality and Research Productivity: 
Measuring Innovation with Multiple Indicators*. The Economic Journal, 114(495), 441-
465. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2004.00216.x 
Leonard, W. N. (1971). Research and development in industrial growth. Journal of political 
economy., 79(4).  
Makri, M., Lane, P. J., & Gomez-Mejia, L. R. (2006). CEO incentives, innovation, and 
performance in technology-intensive firms: a reconciliation of outcome and behavior-
based incentive schemes. Strategic Management Journal, 27(11), 1057-1080. doi: 
10.1002/smj.560 
Murphy, G. B., Trailer, J. W., & Hill, R. C. (1996). Measuring performance in entrepreneurship 
research. Journal of Business Research, 36(1), 15-23. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0148-
2963(95)00159-X 
Murphy, K. J. (1999). Chapter 38 Executive compensation. In C. A. Orley & C. David (Eds.), 
Handbook of Labor Economics (Vol. Volume 3, Part 2, pp. 2485-2563): Elsevier. 
Nelson, R. R. (1991). Why do firms differ, and how does it matter? Strategic Management 
Journal, 12(S2), 61-74. doi: 10.1002/smj.4250121006 
Percival, J., & Mcgrath, C. (2013). Short-term and long-term returns to innovation from the 
aplication of technology and trading practices. International Journal of Innovation 
Management, 17(05), 1350023. doi: doi:10.1142/S1363919613500230 
Shim, D., Lee, J., & Joo, n. K. (2009). CEO Compensation and US High-tech and Low-tech 
Firms’ Corporate Performance. Contemporary Management Research, Vol. 5, 93-106.  
Solow, R. M. (1988). Growth Theory and After. The American Economic Review, 78(3), 307-
317.  
101 
 
Spieth, P., & Hedenreich, S. (2013). Why innovations fail - The case of passive and active 
innovation resistance. International Journal of Innovation Management, 17(05), 1350021. 
doi: doi:10.1142/S1363919613500217 
Tosi, H. J., & Gomez-Mejia, L. R. (1989). The Decoupling of CEO Pay and Performance: An 
Agency Theory Perspective. Administrative Science Quarterly, 34(2), 169-189.  
William, G. (2003). Econometric analysis. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall. 
Young, S., & Jing, Y. (2011). Stock Repurchases and Executive Compensation Contract Design: 
The Role of Earnings per Share Performance Conditions. Accounting Review, 86(2), 703-
733. doi: 10.2308/accr.00000024 
 
  
102 
 
Table 4 – Dependent and independent executive compensation 
Name Definition Units 
Assets The Total Assets as reported by the company. Millions 
Brand and patent 
net 
Represents the net book value of brands, patents and trademarks. 
This item is available in the annual original and annual restated time series 
for detailed companies, full update. 
Millions 
Cash flow 
Represent the net cash receipts and disbursements resulting from the 
operations of the company. It is the sum of Funds from Operations, Funds 
From/Used for Other Operating Activities and Extraordinary Items 
Millions 
CEO_Comp Total Compensation (Salary + Bonus + Other Annual + Restricted Stock Grants + LTIP Payouts + All Other + Value of Option Grants) Thousands 
Common equity Represents common shareholders' investment in a company. Millions 
Employees Number of employees as reported by companies Millions 
Market 
Capitalization 
Represents the total market value of the company based on year end price 
and number of shares outstanding converted to U.S. dollars using the year 
end exchange rate. For companies with more than one type of 
common/ordinary share, market capitalization represents the total market 
value of the company. 
Percentage 
NIBEX The Net Income Before Extraordinary Items and Discontinued Operations. Millions 
OIBD The Operating Income Before Depreciation as reported by the company. Millions 
Patents/Sales Total U.S. patents owned in the current year divided by net sales or revenue in US dollars Percentage 
R&D 
Research and development expense, represents all direct and indirect costs 
related to the creation and development of new processes, techniques, 
applications and products with commercial possibilities. 
Millions 
R&D/Assets R&D expenditures over total assets as a proxi for risk-taking in long-term 
corporate investments 
Percentage 
R&D/Sales Research and Development Expense / Net Sales or Revenues * 100 Percentage 
R&D/Sales - 5 yr 
avg 
Arithmetic average of the last five years of Research and Development 
SALES Percentage 
Return Index 
A return index (RI) is available for individual equities and unit trusts. This 
shows a theoretical growth in value of a shareholding over a specified 
period, assuming that dividends are re-invested to purchase additional units 
of an equity or unit trust at the closing price applicable on the ex-dividend 
date. 
Percentage 
ROA The Net Income Before Extraordinary Items and Discontinued Operations divided by Total Assets. This quotient is then multiplied by 100. Percentage 
SALES The Net Annual Sales as reported by the company. Millions 
SALES 
GROWTH Annual growth of Sales as reported by the company. Percentage 
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Table 5 - Correlations between variables 
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1. General conclusions 
 
The main purpose of this study was to examine whether the total remuneration paid to CEOs in 
high-technology firms in the S&P 1500 is related to corporate finance. This work tries to 
understand how CEOs are compensated when managing high-tech firms and how their 
performance and innovation are driven to improve shareholders’ wealth and to promote their own 
goals.  
The first essay aims at explaining the influence that performance has on CEO compensation 
for short- and long-term periods in these groups of companies. It was found that there is a strong 
and positive relation between CEO compensation and firm performance.  According to the results 
obtained, there is empirical evidence to state that in high-technology firms in the S&P, during the 
period between 2000 and 2010, performance determined total CEO compensation in short- and 
long-term periods, together with accruals of financial performance measurements. Results 
suggest that high-tech firms tend to use more sophisticated performance measurements than other 
firms to determine CEO compensation. The method used has potential implications in finance 
and accounting, for instance, where it is preferable to separately capture the specific effects of 
firm and performance. 
The main purpose of the second essay, included in chapter 3, is to examine whether the total 
compensation paid to CEOs in high-technology firms is related to corporate finance, and tries to 
understand how compensations are influenced by the introduction of the Standard Financial 
Accounting, SFAS 123 (R). This study will contribute to a better understanding of the 
relationship between compensation and performance in high-technology firms caused by the new 
role of expensing stock options with the SFAS 123 (R).  This is consistent with the results 
achieved by Carter et al. (2007), who stated that the favorable accounting treatment for stock 
options possibly lead to overall higher CEO compensations. They state that there is no evidence 
of a decrease in total compensation combined with the positive association between financial 
reporting. The finding that after controlling standard economic determinants of compensation, 
expensing options in firms decrease compensation from options and increase compensation from 
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restricted stock suggest that accounting plays an important role in executive plan design. The 
results in this study indicate that was an increase in CEO compensation after the introduction of 
the SFAS 123 (R). Although the change in the plan design was not analyzed, a new 
accommodation of CEO compensation was found as a result of the new rules of the SFAS 123 
(R). The influence of firm performance on CEO compensation was confirmed and it is positive 
and consistent in this group of high-technology firms in the period studied. 
Finally, the main purpose of the third essay, in chapter 4, was to examine whether the total 
compensation paid to CEOs in high-technology firms in the S&P 500 is related to corporate 
innovation and performance. Furthermore, the essay tries to explain the influence that innovation 
technologies and performance have on CEO compensation in these companies. In conclusion, 
according to the results that were obtained there is empirical evidence to state that in high-
technology firms innovation determined total CEO compensation. The essay also describes the 
main corporate risk taking through which a system of corporate governance shapes innovation 
activities, classifying them according to the three dimensions of the agency problem, corporate 
innovation and risk taking. The findings indicate that CEO compensation in high-tech firms 
chooses innovation over performance, and that there is a strong and positive relation between 
CEO compensation and innovation. This econometric study provides a better understanding of 
the CEO risk taking and the relationship between CEO compensation, innovation and 
performance in high-technology firms. As concluded by Graham et al. (2012), there are 
differences in corporate culture and in the managers’ latent traits, which are difficult to observe 
or measure. These latent traits could be an innate ability, personality, risk aversion or, in this 
case, propensity to innovation, managing uncertain times in order to boost (enhance) returns to 
the firm and reaction to stakeholders. The CEOs of high-tech firms had to maximize returns, 
facing a big competition with new technological solutions, thereby warranting a higher 
compensation than other firms. 
The title of this dissertation is “The executive compensation: Pay-for-performance or 
innovation in high-technology firms”, and the main purpose of this research was to provide an 
answer to this question. After analyzing the databases, the findings show that for this set of US 
S&P companies CEOs choose to promote innovation instead of performance during the period 
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between 2000 and 2010. The financial accrual was used to measure innovation as R&D and to 
measure performance. Many questions around this theme are still unanswered, and for that reason 
there are certainly good topics for future research. 
 
2. Limitations and suggestions for future research 
 
After conducting the research, finding issues that could be further analyzed is always 
promising for that specific scientific area. What happened in this research was no different. This 
study can be enhanced by analyzing the short- and long-term period of CEO compensation to 
understand the goals of CEOs for the duration of R&D projects, brands and patent processes. 
Innovation is generated through a collective and cumulative learning process, such as in R&D 
programs, which requires the commitment of resources for a prolonged period of time. 
Identifying innovation for each firm will consider other expenses and make it possible to better 
classify different components of R&D in financial items. R&D expenses are the best measure of 
innovation and further research could analyze expenses to acquire disembodied technology and 
know-how, expenses with tools, industrial engineering, industrial design and production start-up, as well 
as and marketing expenses for technologically new or improved products. 
This study only focuses on high-technology US firms in the S&P 500 in the period between 
2000 and 2010, but an extended set of observations with different countries, such as European 
countries, and different sectors or industries, would be important to confirm the conclusions. It 
would also be interesting not only to understand the influence that the 2007-2008 crisis had on 
this period, but also to compare CEO compensation before and after this pivotal moment. 
Understanding the Portuguese context in terms of CEO compensation and identifying 
performance and innovation measurements to study the relation between them would also be a 
scientific challenge that would enrich an  area of knowledge that is key to national development.  
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